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Austerity, Debt Overhang, and the Design of
International Standards on Sovereign,
Corporate, and Consumer Debt Restructuring
SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB*
ABSTRACT

Following the Asian Financial Crisis, sovereign debt defaults
prompted calls by the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF)for a statutory
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). In promoting the
SDRM, IMF leaders argued that countries' sovereign debt problems
needed something like U.S. Chapter 11, which is to say that IMF leaders
supported the SDRM proposal with reference to legal claims rather than
relying on purely economic arguments about the welfare benefits of
resolving debt overhang. Framingthe debate in this way caught on, but
by 2005 the IMF board of directors had rejected the SDRM proposal. The
current Global Financial Crisis similarly has resulted in more than
several sovereign borrowers' defaults and has, in turn, renewed calls for
revision of the process for restructuring sovereign indebtedness. This
time, however, the rhetoric has shifted away from legal metaphor. Rather
than comparing sovereign borrowers to corporations in financial
distress, sovereign debt has been discussed in terms reminiscent of
household debt. Countries should, we are told, practice financial
austerity. This paper unpacks the differences among indebtedness owed
by public and private, corporate and consumer, borrowers, and the
distinct implications for restructuring these different sorts of debt. It
argues that modern economic literature on sovereign debt has been
chasing the wrong metaphor. The puzzle of sovereign debt shifts when
sovereign borrowing is viewed through the lens of consumer (not
corporate) borrowing. This shift in metaphor promises more than a new
rhetoric.
* Cooper Family Professor in Urban Legal Issues, Fordham University School of
Law. Many thanks to Fred Aman and those in attendance at the Maurer School of Law
conference on Law and the Globalization of Austerity for their encouragement and
insights. Many additional thanks are owed to Yan Liu, Christoph Paulus, Mark
Weidemaier, lain Ramsay, and Joe Spooner for their comments, questions, and support.
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INTRODUCTION

Sovereign debt defaults in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis
prompted calls by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a
statutory Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). In
promoting the SDRM, IMF leaders argued that countries' debt problems
needed something like U.S. Chapter 11.1 Just as a Chapter 11 plan of
reorganization binds dissenters to its terms, an SDRM would bind
holdouts to a sovereign debt restructuring approved by an
overwhelming majority. This was not the only reference to U.S.
corporate reorganization laws as an international model for resolution
of the debt problems that occurred during the Asian Financial Crisis.
The G-22 had earlier encouraged countries to adopt a range of
structural reforms to raise the level of their financial architecture,
including proposals to reform domestic corporate insolvency laws to
enable the restructuring of debt owed by financially viable businesses,
and the IMF had embraced this contention that corporate insolvency
laws should become more reorganization friendly. 2 In proposing an
SDRM, IMF leaders extended the logic of reforming corporate
insolvency law to the treatment of unsustainable sovereign debt. 3 The
contention was not only that something like Chapter 11 would help
prevent problems from bloated corporate indebtedness, but also that
something like Chapter 11 could help resolve intractable sovereign debt
problems.
The SDRM proposal was controversial-far more controversial than
the notion that corporate insolvency law should be reformed to enable

1. See, e.g., ANNE 0. KRUEGER, IN'L MONETARY FUND, A NEW APPROACH TO
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external1pubs/ft/
exrp/sdrmeng/sdrm.pdf (outlining a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism that
addresses the shortcomings of the current framework for sovereign debt restructuringi.e., delays in seeking restructuring caused by the absence of a predictable restructuring
process, the absence of majority voting mechanisms, and the risk of creditor holdouts).
2. See, e.g., TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL
LAWMAKING AND SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS 141, 248-249 (2009) (noting that "the... G22 . . . made domestic bankruptcy law an integral component of international financial
architecture," and "[t]he IMF... maintained that reorganization would.., lead to orderly
rehabilitation of companies in ways that would forestall national economic crises."); Susan
Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, The Microeconomics and Macropolitics of Systemic

FinancialCrisis: Bankruptcy as a Point of Reference, in SOVEREIGN INSOLVENCY: POSSIBLE
LEGAL SOLUTIONS (Jasna Garasic & Nadia Bodiroga-Vukobrat eds., forthcoming 2015)
(exploring the reasons for and consequences of the G-20's failure to reform insolvency laws
in the aftermath of the current Global Financial Crisis).
3. See KRUEGER, supra note 1, at 10-13.
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reorganization of company debt. 4 Comparing an SDRM to confirmation
of a plan of reorganization was unconvincing to many; public and
corporate debtors are distinct, as are the limits on the restructuring of
sovereign and private commercial debts. Opponents to the SDRM also
argued that the restructuring mechanism could create incentives for
strategic action by sovereign borrowers and that contractual
measures-such as collective action clauses in sovereign bond
offerings-would sufficiently constrain holdouts. 5
Although the SDRM debate was couched in terms of legal
distinctions between corporate and sovereign debt restructurings, there
were, of course, more political issues at stake. 6 Within the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, support had existed for an SDRM on the
grounds that this mechanism would provide a means for limiting
enthusiasm for "rescu[ing] troubled emerging economies" with public
resources and imposing some portion of the costs of unsustainable
sovereign debt on the sovereign lenders who had extended the credit in
the first instance. 7 But this support was not widely backed within the
Department and, indeed, quickly evaporated as the IMF's report went
public.5 By 2003, the IMF Board of Directors had rejected the SDRM
proposal.9
The Board's rejection of the SDRM proposal did not resolve this
policy debate for long. Within a few years, mortgage foreclosures grew
at unexpected rates in the United States, which caused a U.S. financial
crisis to trigger financial crises in Europe and elsewhere around the
4. See generally ROSS P. BUCKLEY, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: POLICY AND
REGULATION 141 (2009) (noting that among the reasons there is no global sovereign
bankruptcy regime is that creditors, while accepting domestic bankruptcy regimes, "have
argued vociferously against a bankruptcy regime internationally..."),
5. See, e.g., GRP. OF 30 [G-30], KEY ISSUES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING: A
WORKING GROUP REPORT 9 (2002), available at http://www.group30.org/images/
PDF/ReportPDFs/sov debt.pdf.
6. See Brad Setser, The PoliticalEconomy of the SDRM, in OVERCOMING DEVELOPING
COUNTRY DEBT CRISES 318 (Barry Herman et al. eds., 2010) (listing the political
constraints that shaped the IMF's sovereign debt-restructuring mechanism: stakeholders
had different views vis-A-vis the proper function of a sovereign bankruptcy regime;
stakeholders for emerging market debt believed they were only indirectly concerned; and
the IMF had to address the stakeholders' expectations while building consensus for
change).
7. Id. at 318.
8. See id.
9. Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], IM Surveillance in Action, Annual Report 2003, at
31-4 (2003), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2003/eng/pdf/file2.pdf. See also Aram
Ziai, The Rise and Fall of the SDRM Proposalin the IMF: An Introduction to Competing
Theoretical Perspectives on Power in the Global Political Economy, 6 & 7 HAMBURG REV.
Soc. Sci. 1, 2 (2012), available at http://www.hamburg-review.com/fileadmin/pdf/06_0307_01/ZiaiSDRM.pdf.
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globe. 10 The Global Financial Crisis resulted in more than several
sovereign borrowers' defaults and has, in turn, renewed calls for
revision of the process for restructuring sovereign indebtedness."l
This time, however, the rhetoric surrounding sovereign lending
practices has shifted somewhat. Rather than comparing sovereign
borrowers to corporations in financial distress, during the current global
crisis many have referred to sovereign debt in terms comparable to
household borrowing. When lending to sovereign borrowers who are
facing national financial crises, the IMF and its European counterparts
(referred to colloquially as the Troika) wanted assurances that
repayment of sovereign loans would be sustainable. 12 They argued that
4
countries had overborrowed 1 3 and should practice financial austerity
as a means of paying down excessive sovereign debt. Like families with
too much credit card debt, sovereign borrowers should address the
problem by learning to live within a budget.
But this commitment to find sustainable sovereign debt levels
through policies of austerity faltered. Efforts to prop up Greek sovereign
debt proved insufficient; the notion that Greek austerity would render
its sovereign borrowing sustainable proved untenable. By 2012, the IMF
insisted on a restructuring of Greek sovereign bonds as a condition to
access to further rescue; private bondholders accepted changed terms in
the face of changed circumstances. 15 In 2013, the IMF conditioned
assistance to Cyprus on "bail-in" from uninsured depositors in
systemically important Cypriot banks. 16 With a new political party in
10. See, e.g., Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra note 2, at 15-16 (explaining the origin of the
Global Financial Crisis as beginning with mortgage-backed securities from 2000 to 2007
and spreading to Europe by 2008).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 173-199.
12. See JAMES BOUGHTON ET AL, CTR. FOR INT'L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION, IMF
LENDING PRACTICES AND SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 5 (2014), https://www.

cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi-pb-41.pdf (mentioning that in order for a country to
qualify for relatively large loan amounts relative to the country's quota, the IMF wanted
there to be a high probability of sustainability in the medium term).
13. See generally LEE C. BUCHHEIT ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., COMM. ON INT'L ECON.
POLICY & REFORM, REVISITING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY (2013) [hereinafter BROOKINGS

REPORT] (discussing sovereign debtors' incentives to overborrow), http://www.brookings.
edu/~/medialresearchlfiles/reports/2013/10/sovereign%20bankruptcyciepr 2013-revisiting
sovereignbankruptcyreport.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Stimulus v Austerity: Sovereign Doubts, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 2013,
http://www.economist.com/news/schools-brief/21586802-fourth-our-series-articlesfinancial-crisis-looks-surge-public (noting that Greece could not delay austerity measures
since it could no longer finance its deficits).
15. See Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., Greek Debt Restructuring:An Autopsy, 28 ECON.
POL'Y 513, 518, 526 (2013).
16. Stavros A. Zenios, The Cyprus Debt: Perfect Crisis and a Way Forward, 7 CYPRUS
ECON. POL'Y REV. 3, 41 (2013).
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power by late 2014, Greece renewed demands to restructure this debt
and loosen austerity requirements, including demands to restructure
debt owed by it to the "lenders of last resort"-the IMF and European
Central Bank (ECB).17 By July 2015, Greece had defaulted on its
obligations to the IMF and was likely to default on debt owed to the
ECB.18 A popular referendum, quickly called by Greek leadership,
returned an unexpected "no" vote to further demands for austerity from
the Troika, leaving negotiations on the terms of further lending (and
any possible restructuring of existing debt) up in the air.19
Since 2013, the international community has begun to revisit
questions regarding its approach to requests for sovereign lending in
times of crisis. Several reports by IMF staff to its Board, including one
in 201320 and another in 2014,21 carefully compare various methods for

resolving sovereign debt problems, including fresh consideration of
debate on best practices for sovereign debt lending and debt
restructuring. Concluding that sovereign debt restructurings often come
22
"too late" and involve "too little" assistance to promote full recovery,
IMF staff members have proposed a variation on the IMF's earlier
SDRM proposal. Rather than bind dissenting holdouts to a full blown
sovereign debt restructuring, they propose a "reprofiling" of some of this
debt-a term meant to indicate an extension of bond due dates but no
other amendments to the terms of the reprofiled sovereign debt-but
17. See Peter Eavis, Jack Ewing, & Landon Thomas Jr., IMF and Central Bank Loom
Large Over Greece's Debt Talks, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (May 10, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/05/11/business/dealbooklimf-and-central-bank-loom-large-over-greecesdebt-talks.html? r=0.
18. See Gabriele Steinhauser et al., Greece Defaults on IMP Loan Despite New Push
for BailoutAid: EuropeanFinance Chiefs Shut Down Athens's Last-Minute Request for
Emergency FinancialAid, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2015, 12:12 AM, http://www.wsj.coml
articles/some-greek.banks-to-open-for-pensioners-1435653433.
19. See Ian Traynor, John Hooper, and Helena Smith, Greek Referendum No Vote
Signals Huge Challenge to Eurozone Leaders, THE GUARDIAN, July 5, 2015, 21:48,
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/ul/05/greek-referendum-no-vote-signals-hugechallenge-to-eurozone-leaders; Douglas J. Elliott, Greece and Europe: This way to the exit?
BROOKINGS UPFRONT (July 6, 2015 8: 28 am EST), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/upfront/posts/2015/07/06-greece-and-europe-exit-eu-elliot?utm-campaign=Brookings+Brief&
utmsource=hs email&utmmedium=email&utmcontent=20396398&_hsenc=p2ANqtz.
ZvaHcc7gYU2EqOTgNla4bO6cxerlJSzPyJOUCI0twbcV67AuH7dEVvO4wRuQ-Lvyw
CVHTiKEDD49ULaVmL7ePV3V2T76pO2xCJJKvEAMPBIA72uc&_hsmi=20396398.
20. IMF, Sovereign Debt Restructuring-Recent Developments and Implications for the
Fund's Legal and Policy Framework 39 (Apr. 26, 2013) https://www.imf.org/external/np/
pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf [hereinafter 2013 Staff Report].
21. IMF, The Fund's Lending Framework and Sovereign Debt-Preliminary
Considerations (June 2014), http://www.imf.org/external/pp/ppindex.aspx [hereinafter
2014 Staff Report] (discussing the implementation issues of reprofiling the IMF's lending
framework).
22. 2013 Staff Report, supranote 20, para. 4, at 7.

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

22:2

make clear that this reprofiling would occur purely as a matter of
voluntary enforcement of contractual terms and not a statutorily
23
imposed mandate.
The self-organized Committee on International Economic Policy and
Reform, writing under the aegis of the Brookings Institute, put forward
its own report, in which it proposed three alternative mechanisms: one
contractual, involving coordinated introduction of a strong form of
collective action clauses; one statutory, involving legislation that
immunizes "all payment and clearing systems in large financial
centers"; and another IMF-based, involving a Sovereign Debt
Adjustment Facility. 24 The statutory proposal would condition lending
25
from the IMF on the restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debt.
The Committee premised its several proposals on the notion that some
countries may overborrow 26 and then wait too long to restructure their
27
unsustainable debts.
The characterization of sovereign debt relief as "too little, too late"
sounds familiar to the ears of those attuned to debate in the United
States on corporate insolvency reform. Corporate reorganization reform
was urged in the 1970s on the grounds that companies should be
encouraged not to wait to file until there was "nothing left to
reorganize." 28 This argument helped to shift concerns about the moral
hazards of reforming corporate reorganization law in the United States
in the mid-1970s. It may be hoped that similar arguments will shift
similar fears about sovereign debt restructuring.
But is the case for sovereign debt restructuring or reprofiling best
framed in terms reminiscent of debate on corporate insolvency reform?
Or, is it instead better understood as a question about when sovereign
debt becomes "unsustainable" and who should sit in judgment of these
nations' economic sustainability-the debtor, some body of creditors, or
an objective third party? This paper explores the differences between
indebtedness owed by public and private-corporate, consumer, and
sovereign-borrowers, and the implications of the restructuring of these
distinct sorts of debt for different sorts of debtors' economic recoveries.
23. See 2014 Staff Report, supra note 21, paras. 12-15, at 11-12.
24. BROOKINGs REPORT, supra note 13, at 29-34, 44-46.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 7-10. Although these sections refer explicitly to "overborrowing," one could
also read the Brookings Report as referring to sovereign lenders' propensity to overlend.
See id. at 8 ("Creditors, however, may have incentives to behave recklessly and lend
without adequate regard to risk because official bailout packages may allow for
repayments that are 'too high' with respect to the social optimum.").
27. Id. at 10-12.
28. See generally H.R. Doc. No. 93-137 (1973) (collecting reports on bankruptcy reform
proposals).
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It concludes that there is much to learn from the comparison of
sovereign to consumer debt.
Part I revisits the IMF's SDRM proposal in the wake of the Asian
Financial Crisis and the failure of this proposal to command the needed
international consensus. Support for the proposed SDRM was based on
a comparison to U.S. corporate reorganization law; in the same way that
binding dissenters to an agreement to restructure private debt approved
by creditors is justified on utilitarian grounds, the SDRM proposal was
described as promoting the common good.
Part II comments on the strength of this metaphor. Whatever the
merits of an SDRM, this section distinguishes sovereign from corporate
debt on the grounds that they present distinct obstacles to collection as
well as distinct benefits from restructuring. It concludes that the
metaphor to Chapter 11 corporate reorganization is imperfect but
useful, especially in terms of offering a politically desirable framing of
the issues at hand.
Part III turns to current events and current proposals for
improvements in the process for sovereign debt restructuring. It argues
that talk of countering questionably sustainable sovereign debt with
austerity measures resembles the finger-wagging that overextended
households often receive in the way of debt advice, and it questions
whether restructuring of sovereign debts resembles the belt-tightening
efforts that a family might pursue in similar circumstances.
Based on these distinctions, Part IV returns to the metaphor
comparing sovereign debt to household debt and draws conclusions
about renewed proposals for resolving sovereign debt problems. While
the metaphor of sovereign debt to consumer debt may seem even more
strained than the comparison of sovereign debt restructuring to
corporate reorganization, this section argues that the shift in
perspective explains much about sovereign debt and sovereign debt
restructuring practices. Reframing sovereign debt problems as akin to
consumer debt problems could renew interest in developing a
framework for responsible sovereign lending and a fresh perspective on
the goals and means for sovereign debt restructuring. 29

29. See infra text accompanying notes 243-255. This paper is not the first to compare
sovereign debt to consumer debt. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principlesand the
Odious Debt Doctrine: The Missing Link in the Debate, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 6768 (2007); Robert K. Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L. J. 1159, 1180-84 (2004). Nor is it the first to recommend
assessment of responsible sovereign lending practices. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., PRINCIPLES ON PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN
LENDING AND BORROWING (Jan. 10, 2012) [hereinafter UNCTAD PRINCIPLES],
The
UNCTAD
http://unctadxiii.org/en/SessionDocument/gdsddf2Ol2miscl-en.pdf.
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I. THE IMF's SDRM PROPOSAL IN THE WAKE OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL
CRISIS

In the summer of 1997, a financial crisis in Thailand triggered
similar problems throughout Southeast Asia. The Philippines, Malaysia,
Singapore, and South Korea suffered currency devaluations, failures of
banks and finance companies, and corporate financial distress.
Financial institutions later failed in Hong Kong and Singapore as well,
prompting financial failures in the then newly-constituted Russian
Federation, in Brazil and Argentina, and in the United States in the
30
form of the failure and bailout of Long-Term Capital Management.
Stock markets roiled throughout the world; the Asian Financial Crisis
31
threatened the world's economy.
The Asian Financial Crisis demonstrated the interconnectedness of
globalized financial markets-markets that were interconnected
geographically, to be sure, but also connected across debt sectors, with
capital flight prompting both bank and corporate failures. These
financial failures prompted countries' intuitions to bail out companies

and banks, which in turn prompted further capital flight, imbalances in
32
currency and trade, and threats of default in sovereign debt markets.
The international community responded to this threat with financial
assistance. The IMF and World Bank extended loans to the Philippines,
Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, but this financial assistance
created market concern that these were "bailouts" that would promote
"moral hazard" in lending markets-that is, excessive risk taking in
future lending and borrowing decisions. 33 In part to assuage these
concerns, these international financial institutions (IFIs) attached
strings to this crisis lending. As with similar loans that had been
extended to Mexico and other countries several years earlier, the IMF
conditioned these loans on sovereign borrowers' adoption of specific
34
economic and legal reforms.
Among the wide range of reforms encouraged through this policy of
conditionality, the IMF and World Bank sought reform of corporate
Principles, which have garnered little interest in the international community, were not
premised on a comparison of sovereign to consumer debt.
30. See, e.g., ANDREW SHENG, FROM ASIAN TO GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: AN ASIAN
REGULATOR'S VIEW OF UNFETTERED FINANCE IN THE 1990S AND 2000s (2009).
31. Id.
32. Id.

33. Id. at 113.
34. IMF, Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the Role of the IMF, § IV (June 2000),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm#I (noting that these "structural
reforms" received greater prominence in the rescue packages extended during the Asian
Financial Crisis than in "typical IMF programs").
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insolvency laws, including laws providing for "the establishment of
viable workout mechanisms." 35 The need for financial-sector reforms
was also viewed as "pressing," including, for example, efforts to
strengthen "financial supervision and regulation." 36 In addition, the
IMF encouraged "measures to increase transparency in the financial,
corporate, and government sectors," "steps to improve the efficiency of
markets and increase competition," and "efforts to shield poor and
'37
vulnerable sections of society from the worst of the crisis.
Although the IMF's policies of conditionality were controversial,
legislatures in Korea, Indonesia, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia
nonetheless adopted the recommended laws governing regulation of
financial and capital markets, facilitating the restructuring of corporate
indebtedness and mandating transparency in securities and other
capital markets. 38 The Asian Financial Crisis cooled quickly. By late
1999, it had quieted; within several years, markets were viewed as
39
having returned to normal.
Economic recovery, however, did not dispel questions surrounding
the wisdom of "bailing out" these emerging economies or the illegitimacy
of the IFIs' conditional lending policies. In an effort to resolve this
tension, finance ministers and central bank governors from twenty-two
"systemically significant" economies met in April and again in October
of 1998. Although in the past the leaders of the seven or eight largest
industrialized democracies had met as a Group of Eight, it was agreed
that reaction to the Asian Financial Crisis should also involve a larger
and more inclusive club of nations. At the Asia-Pacific Economic
Conference in 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton and other Asia-Pacific
Economic Corporation (APEC) leaders announced the formation of the
G-22, which would focus specifically on matters of international
40
finance.

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
HALLIDAY & CARRUTHERS, supra note 2, at 166-246.
39. See Timothy Geithner, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.,
Reflections on the Asian Financial Crises (June 20, 2007) ("Recovery in the Asian crisis
countries took time, but it was stronger and more rapid than had been typical in other
emerging market financial crises. Barely 18 months after the crisis, for example, Korean
GDP had returned to pre-crisis levels, and this was true for all the Asian crisis countries
by 2003.").
40. See IMF, Factsheet: A Guide to Committees, Groups, and Clubs 8 (Oct. 3, 2014),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm#G22.

38. See, e.g.,

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 22:2

The G-22 issued a lengthy Report on the International Financial
Architecture at the first of two meetings. 41 Through three separate
working groups (transparency and accountability; strengthening
financial systems; and international financial crises), the G-22
recommended a long list of structural reforms "related to the stability of
the international financial system and the effective functioning of global
capital markets." 42 These reports proposed revisions to prevent future
financial crises, with each working group focused on a distinct aspect of
this problem: the working group on transparency and accountability
looked to ensure that balance sheets and other public records
transparently revealed information to the markets; the working group
on strengthening financial systems focused on financial institutions;
and the working group on international financial crises tied the
financial health of these entities to that of sovereign states more
generally.
For example, proposals to enhance transparency and accountability
included statements regarding consensus on the importance of private
sector disclosure and the need for this information to be timely,
complete, and consistently reported. 43 The working group on enhancing
transparency and accountability recommended international agreement
on accounting standards and transparency on a broad range of financial
and fiscal information reported by banks and corporations. 44 The
working group on strengthening financial systems endorsed adoption of
existing principles on banking supervision and securities regulation; it
encouraged the development of principles on corporate governance,
internal controls, and deposit insurance. 45 Proposals to strengthen
international standards for corporate insolvency and collection laws
46
were included among this long list of reforms.
The working group on transparency and accountability emphasized
the importance of reforming corporate insolvency laws. Nonperforming
corporate loans might be hidden from market scrutiny, which could in
turn inflate banks' balance sheets. Restructuring these nonperforming
loans could clarify and improve financial conditions at both the
corporate and bank levels. This structural reform might also have
broader systemic effects. In addition, the working group on
international financial crises identified "effective insolvency and debtor-

41.
1998),
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See IMF, Summary of Reports on the InternationalFinancialArchitecture 1 (Oct.
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g22/summry.pdf.
Id.; see also id. at 2-3.
See id. at 6.
See id. at 8-9.
See id. at 11-13.
See id. at 13.
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creditor regimes" as important to "limiting financial crises and
47
facilitating rapid and orderly workouts from excessive indebtedness";
it linked recommendations on restructuring and reorganizing corporate
over-indebtedness with that of public sector debt, stressing "the need to
encourage better management of risk by the private and public
sectors." 48 While it emphasized that "[c]ountries should make the
strongest possible efforts to meet the terms and conditions of all debt
contracts in full and on time" and cautioned that "[u]nilateral
suspension of payments are inherently disruptive," the working group
also set out a framework for promoting "the collective interest of
[sovereign] debtors and creditors in cooperative and orderly debt
workouts," 49 which included recommendations for expanded use of a
range of "collective action clauses" in sovereign debt instruments, as
well as official support for temporary suspensions in certain
50
circumstances.
In articulating the details of this framework, the G-22's financial
crisis working group also explicitly drew a comparison between
corporate and sovereign debt restructuring. Although noting that
insolvency regimes can facilitate the orderly workout of corporate debt
in a time of crisis, it conceded "[t]here is currently no analogous regime
for sovereign debtors" and that the "creation of an internationally
agreed and binding insolvency regime for sovereign debtors is
unlikely." 51 It recommended inclusion of collective action clauses to
enhance creditor coordination, while admitting that these "clauses are
not likely to prove a panacea." 52 It provided guidance on the role of
sovereign borrowers, the international community, and the private
sector in this context, including discussion of "[m]echanisms to facilitate
' 53
prompt and equitable workouts.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 20, 22. See also AMITA BATRA, INDIAN COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH ON INTL

(2002),
http://www.
RELATIONS,
SOVEREIGN
DEBT
RESTRUCTURING
icrier.org/pdflOP02SovDebt.pdf (discussing approaches to sovereign debt restructuring in
the aftermath of the emerging market financial crises of the late 1990s). The G-22 report
was not the first report to recommend the including of Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in
sovereign bonds. The Rey Report, issued by the G-10 in 1996, also had done so six years
earlier. See BATRA, at 27.
51. Mervyn King et al., Bank for Int'l Settlements, Report of the Working Group on
InternationalFinancialCrises 19 (Oct. 2, 1998), https://www.bis.org/publ/ othp0ld.pdf.
52. Id. at 20.
53. Id. at 33 ("Insolvency regimes generally provide a mechanism for the provision of
new, senior credits to ensure the ongoing operation of the firm and the restructuring of
existing debt. While the analogy to corporate insolvency is imprecise, working out
international liquidity crises may also require mechanisms to encourage new capital
ECON.
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Connecting corporate and sovereign debt restructuring was not
simply a matter of intellectual purity for the G-22. It was widely
understood that the Asian Financial Crisis had been triggered, in part,
by over-indebted corporations in Indonesia and elsewhere. 54 Because
Chaebols accounted for a huge percentage of the balance sheets of
Korea's largest banks-indeed, a significant portion of Korea's overall
Gross National Product (GNP)-liquidation of these insolvent entities
would have had systemic consequences. 55 Commitments of financial
support for Korean corporations and financial institutions caused
markets to question the sustainability of sovereign indebtedness. The G22's report was meant, in part, to quell these concerns. Its
recommendation of Chapter 11-like corporate reorganization laws in
Asia and elsewhere was an implicit criticism of national bailouts of
these corporations.
The G-22 was concerned about more than the possibility of corporate
bailouts; it was also concerned about the prospect of bailouts of
sovereign debt. While the Asian Tigers subsequently repaid the rescue
packages extended to them by the IMF, earlier experience with loans to
Mexico and several South American countries made clear the political
pressure for bailouts that could not be ignored.
The G-22's recommendations on sovereign debt emerged out of a
rich academic debate on whether sovereign debt restructuring should be
encouraged, and, if so, how this encouragement might best be
structured. As early as 1981, commentators had argued that sovereign
debt restructuring should be more closely patterned on U.S. Chapter 11
reorganization plans. 56 While initially references to U.S. Chapter 11

inflows and supplementary frameworks to facilitate the orderly restructuring of existing
debt.").
54. See, e.g., Steven Radelet & Jeffrey Sachs, The Onset of the East Asian Financial
Crisis, in CURRENCY CRISES 105, 114 (Paul Krugman ed., 2000), available at http://www.
nber.org/chapters/c8691.pdf (noting that "in all countries except Korea, bank lending to
nonbanks exceeded lending to banks").
55. Id.
56. See BENJAMIN J. COHEN, ESSAYS IN INT'L FIN., PRINCETON UNIV., DEVELOPINGCOUNTRY DEBT: A MIDDLE WAY 3 (1989); JEFFREY SACHS, PRINCETON STUD. IN INT'L FIN.,

THEORETICAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL BORROWING 38 (1984) (noting that in liquidity
crises the credit market can overcome individual banks' tendency to squeeze credit by
collectively forming loan agreements that guarantee debt rescheduling at below-market
rates); Benjamin J. Cohen, A Global Chapter 11, 75 FOREIGN POL'Y 109, 122 (1989);
Christopher G. Oechsli, ProceduralGuidelines for Renegotiating LDC Debt: An Analogy to
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 305, 308-09 (1981). See
generally Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Early Ideas on Sovereign Bankruptcy
Reorganization:A Survey (IMF, Working Paper No. WP02/57, 2002), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wpO257.pdf (surveying the history of sovereign debt
restructuring mechanisms based on Chapter 11 bankruptcy principles).
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presented only a metaphor for orderly collative action, by the mid-1990s
these proposals began to push on the comparison and propose
mandatory statutory mechanisms for binding holdouts to a
restructuring agreement.5 7 Later commentators questioned the need for
a statutory resolution of this collective action problem, arguing that
contractual provisions such as collective action clauses (CACs) through
which bondholders agreed ex ante to be bound by a specified
supermajority held important advantages. 5 8 Rather than choosing sides
in the debate, the G-22 report recommending inclusion of CACs in
sovereign bond offerings assumed both the wisdom and the political
difficulties of an international effort of this sort and looked to offer
second-best proposals that were more likely to be implemented.
Shortly after the G-22's report on a new financial architecture, the
IMF weighed in on some of the same issues. In 1999, its Office of Legal
Counsel had published a short tract on "Orderly and Effective
Insolvency Regimes," which fully supported and expanded on the G-22's
recommendations regarding the desirability of a reorganization-friendly
corporate insolvency regime.5 9 In a surprise to many, IMF senior staff
57. See BATRA, supra note 50, at 5 (noting that by 1995, "the proposals for sovereign
debt restructuring had alternated between Oechsli's voluntary procedures and Cohen's
statutory proposals," and that "there was at this time a suggestion towards a contractual
approach to orderly debt resolution").
58. See, e.g., BARRY EICHENGREEN & RICHARD PORTES, CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY
WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS 49 (1995) (recommending "[cihanges in bond
covenants to permit a majority of creditors to alter the terms of payment").
59. See IMF Legal Dep't, Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures, Foreword,
Appendix, Part IV(B) (1999), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ftorderly/. The IMFs
report on corporate insolvency laws would be followed by the World Bank's Principles and
Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems, see generally World
Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems
(Apr. 2001), http://www.worldbank.orgifa/ipgeng.pdf, revised by World Bank, 2011
Principlesfor Effective Insolvency and Creditor/DebtorRegimes (Jan. 20, 2011), available
at http://siteresources.worldbank.orgINTGILD/Resources/ICR
PrinciplesJan2011.pdf
(developing and later revising insolvency principles to guide system reform and
benchmarking in developing countries), and UNCITRAL's Legislative Guide on Insolvency
Law, see generally UN's Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law
(2005) [hereinafter UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law], http://www.
uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven05-80722_Ebook.pdf (designing key objectives and
provisions for effective insolvency law). Together these reports are understood to set
international standards for corporate insolvency law. See, e.g., World Bank, Principlesfor
Effective Creditor Rights and Insolvency Systems, GLOBAL INSOLVENCY LAW DATABASE,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITEEXTERNAIJTOPICS/
EXTLAWJUSTICE/EXTGILD/0,,contentMDK:22095859-menuPK:64874173-pagePK:478
9622-piPK:64873779-theSitePK:5807555,00.html
('The 2011 Principles have been
reviewed and revised to incorporate updates to UNCITRAL's Legislative Guide on
Insolvency Law. In this regard, two new Principles (C16 and C17) have been added to
reflect the best International Practice concerning the insolvency of Enterprise Groups.").
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subsequently expressed their views on practices for addressing
sovereign loans during times of crisis.6 0 Anne Krueger, the IMF's First
Deputy Managing Director, addressed the National Economists' Club in
Washington, D.C. in 2001 and proposed the establishment of an SDRM
under the auspices of the IMF on the grounds that voluntary measures
alone were insufficient. 6 1 By mid-2002, Krueger published an IMF tract,
titled "A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring," in which she
62
laid out in greater detail her SDRM proposal.
Although this timeline paints Krueger's SDRM proposal in the
context of the Asian Financial Crisis and the G-22's report calling for a
new financial architecture, the connections here are less clear-cut. At
the height of this Crisis, the IMF had extended significant lending
assistance to several of the Asian Tigers, but these sovereign loans were
not at risk by 2001 and 2002.63 What, then, had prompted the IMF's
SDRM proposal in 2001? Commentators argue that, more likely,
Krueger and her legal staff were focused on the possibility of sovereign
default elsewhere around the globe, such as Argentina. 64 The fact that
the G-22 had promulgated its report on sovereign debt in the context of
the Asian Financial Crisis and as a result had linked issues of corporate
and sovereign debt restructuring as logically connected, were points of
reference less salient to the IMF proposal. Krueger, however, left the
distinction between this Crisis and future possible crises unclear when
putting forward her SDRM proposal. At most, Krueger and her team
supported the case for an SDRM as important to "both crisis prevention
65
and crisis resolution."

60. See, e.g., Ziai, supra note 9, at 2.
61. See Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, Int'l Monetary Fund,
International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, at Part IV (Nov. 26, 2001), http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/
2001/112601.htm (reproducing Krueger's speech given at the National Economists' Club
Annual Members' Dinner at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington D.C.).
62. See generally KRUEGER, supra note 1 (outlining the broad features of Krueger's
SDRM proposal).
63. See, e.g., Setser, supra note 6, at 318 n.4.
64. Id. at 317.
65. Anne 0. Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, IMF, Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism - One Year Later, at Part II (Dec. 10, 2002),
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/20O2/121002.htm (reproducing Krueger's speech
presented at the European Commission in Brussels, Belgium). Krueger went on in this
speech to elaborate that the SDRM and other proposals to reform resolving sovereign debt
restructuring practices "would contribute to crisis prevention because private markets
would lend less to countries with already high debt-to-GDP ratios" and "would make crisis
resolution more orderly and less costly, by providing incentives for countries to face up to
their problems promptly." Id.
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Building on earlier commentators' metaphors, Krueger compared
66
her proposed SDRM to a U.S. Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding.
Although earlier commentators had differed on what they meant when
they compared sovereign debt restructuring to corporate reorganization,
Krueger identified four elements as critical to her proposal: (1) a stay of
creditor enforcement during negotiations; (2) measures to protect
creditors during the stay; (3) encouragement for new financing during
proceedings; and (4) a mechanism to bind dissenters based on
67
acceptance by a supermajority of similarly situated creditors.
Recognizing that for an SDRM to bind dissenters it had to be supported
by an international agreement of some sort, Krueger argued that the
IMF was the best forum for the SDRM and, thus, that international
68
agreement should occur through amendment to the IMF's Articles.
There was little political support for an SDRM, however. Nearly as
soon as Krueger made the SDRM proposal public, policy makers in the
U.S. Department of the Treasury expressed their preference for
contractual measures to address sovereign debt restructuring. 69 The G22 had disbanded by 2000, and was replaced by a slightly different G20. In its 1998 report, the G-22 had "forged consensus on a framework
for debt restructuring ([centered on] collective action clauses and
voluntary standards) and on the need for IMF quota reform," 70 but
thereafter, the newly formed G-20 stepped back from exercising
leadership on these issues. In its 2002 report, the G-20 hedged its bets
and supported all extant proposals-it supported "work on
comprehensive and market compatible approaches to crisis resolution,
including CACs, a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, and a code
of good practices." 71 Nor was there much support for the SDRM proposal
66. See KRUEGER, supra note 1, at 10. Later in her proposal, Krueger also compares an
SDRM to U.S. Chapter 9, governing municipal bankruptcy. See id. at 12-14.
67. Id. at 11. For a further elaboration of these principles, see id. at 14-20.
68. See id. at 33-35.
69. John B. Taylor, Under Sec'y of the Treasury for Int'l Affairs, US Dep't of the
Treasury, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A US Perspective (April 2, 2002) available at
(reproducing
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/print.cfm?ResearchId=455&doc=pub
remarks at the conference Sovereign Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards at the Institute
for International Economics in Washington, D.C.). The U.S. response to Krueger's
proposed SDRM was consistent with earlier statements by high-level officials in the
Canadian government. See Batra, supra note 50, at 2.
70. Ngaire Woods, The G-20 Leaders and Global Governance 3 (Global Econ.
Governance Programme, Global Economic Governance Programme, University College,
Oxford, Working Paper No. 2010/59, Oct. 2010), available at http://www.bruegel.org/
fileadminlbruegel files[Researchcontributions/AEEF contributions/G20_Completing the
_agendalSlNWoods.pdf.
71. Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, The G-20 After Eight Years: How Effective a Vehicle for
Developing-Country Influence? app. 2 at 29 (Brookings Inst., Global Econ. & Dev.,
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from the emerging economies.7 2 At around the same time as Krueger
put forward her SDRM proposal, sovereign debt crises erupted in
Argentina and Turkey, but both countries rejected loans from the IMF. 73
Mostly, the SDRM affected sovereign contracting. If anything, "[t]he
IMF's serious pursuit of an international bankruptcy regime . . .
contributed to Mexico's decision to introduce collection action clauses" in
their bonds, a move that many viewed as undermining arguments that
an SDRM was needed to ensure orderly collective action in this
74
context.
By 2003, the Board of Directors for the IMF voted to reject the
SDRM proposal.7 5 With the IMF reluctant to amend its bylaws, the
likelihood of the necessary international agreement on an SDRM
diminished substantially, and the issue languished in the financial
boom of the early twenty-first century.

II. COMPARING SOVEREIGN BORROWERS TO A DEBTOR IN POSSESSION
Whether public or private debt is at issue, all restructuring
agreements suffer from the same basic problem: because they are purely
contractual, multiparty restructuring agreements are enforceable only
against those who agree to be bound. As such, incentives arise for some
creditors to hold out strategically, even if the terms of the agreement
otherwise make economic sense. Holdouts can demand full payment
from the debtor. When only a few creditors hold out, this demand might
be viewed as the price of getting the deal done. Depending on the
number of the holdouts or the value of their claims, however, dissenters'
demands for a premium can easily unravel a nascent restructuring
agreement. Collective action problems, thus, complicate negotiation of a
debt restructuring.
When Anne Krueger and earlier commentators pointed to U.S.
Chapter 11 as a model for their SDRM proposals, they understood that
a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization can enable socially beneficial
restructurings to take place because it binds dissenting creditors-the
holdouts mentioned above-to an agreement reached by a supermajority
of the debtor's other creditors. Chapter 11 solves holdout problems by

Working Paper No. 12, Oct. 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/
researchlfiles/papers/2007/10/17development/l017development.pdf.
72. See Setser, supra note 6, at 318, 338 n.4 ("Unlike the major Latin economies, most
Asian economies hold so many reserves that they no longer worry about their ability to
borrow from the IMF.").
73. Id.
74. Id. at 319.
75. Ziai, supranote 9, at 2.
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creating a statutory mandate for dissenting creditors' participation in
an agreement reached by a supermajority of creditors.
This statutory result comes at a price. When binding dissenters,
Chapter 11 also looks to protect those creditors that would have been
holdouts outside of the bankruptcy. 76 It protects them both
substantively and procedurally. Procedurally, Chapter 11 protects
dissenters by mandating disclosure and good faith negotiation, 77 by
specifying how and when creditors' claims are classed together 78 and
how their votes are counted in assessing whether approval of a
supermajority has been attained. 79 It also institutes a system of checks
and balances on the powers of a debtor in possession during the
pendency of a case, such as through the appointment of a representative
committee of creditors and through other means.8 0 Just as importantly,
Chapter 11 protects dissenters substantively-for example, by requiring
bankruptcy courts to assess whether the agreed-upon plan of
reorganization is "feasible,"8 1 whether priority claims will be paid in
full,8 2 and whether every creditor, including dissenters, will receive as
much under the plan as they would have received in a liquidation of the
debtor.8 3 Provisions permitting the confirmation of a prepackaged or
prenegotiated plan of reorganization provide additional procedural
84
protections for both supermajorities and their holdouts.

76. Chapter 11 binds dissenters based on the agreement of a supermajority of the
debtor's creditors, and on this ground has been referred to as resolving collective action
problems. But resolution of hold-out problems should not be conflated with other ways in
which bankruptcy law more generally resolves common pool problems. Especially where
business debtors are concerned, a debtor's insolvency can prompt multiple defaults and
multiple creditors pursuing simultaneous collection actions. Outside of bankruptcy, these
creditors' race for the courthouse is understood to destroy value-and in particular to
destroy the "going concern" value of an entity. Bankruptcy solves this collective action
problem by means of an automatic stay aimed at protecting a debtor's operations and
avoiding prepetition asset grabs. See generally Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987) (discussing the prototypes of default and the impact on
creditors drawn into bankruptcy).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2013).
78. See id. § 1122.
79. Id. § 1126(d). Only the votes of impaired claims are counted, a concept defined in
section 1124 of the Code. See id. § 1124.
80. The Code requires formation of an Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors,
except in a small business cases. See id. §§ 1102-1103. Although generally a debtor
remains in possession of property of the estate and exercises the powers of a trustee in
bankruptcy, see id. §§ 1107-1108, a trustee might be appointed for cause. See id. §§ 11041105.
81. Id. § 1129(a)(11); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 128 (1978).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9) (2013).
83. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
84. Id. § 1129(a).
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These procedural and substantive protections for dissenters
measure the fairness of a proposed plan of reorganization against what
creditors would have received if the debtor's assets were sold quickly
and the proceeds distributed to its creditors on a pro rata basis. But a
sovereign debtor's assets mostly defy liquidation. And sovereign debtors
enjoy immunity from most litigation in most courts. As a result, the
fairness of binding dissenters to the agreement of a supermajority of the
debtor's other sovereign creditors cannot be measured against
liquidation alternatives. In the absence of this comparison, an SDRM
may be nothing like a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. It may be
nothing more than an effort to undermine some creditors' rights to
payment in full.
Of course, Krueger and the commentators who preceded her
understood that Chapter 11 was an imperfect metaphor for an SDRM.
Krueger's report on the SDRM proposal admits as much, conceding that
sovereign debtors differed from corporate debtors because a sovereign
debtor's assets could not be liquidated; that sovereign creditors should
not expect that an SDRM would provide for debt-to-equity conversions
permitting extinguishment of "shareholders' ownership interests" in the
debtor in the way that debt-to-equity swaps worked in corporate
restructurings; and that it would be difficult to replicate in an SDRM
context a similar system of Chapter 11-type checks and balances
intended to safeguard the interests of creditors during the proceedings,
especially nothing that might be viewed as a constraint on a sovereign
debtor's fiscal powers.8 5 Nonetheless, comparisons of the SDRM
proposal to U.S. Chapter 11 persisted, and continued to do so
throughout extended debate on the proposal for reasons that
transcended the fit between corporate and sovereign debt.
As noted above, the metaphor had passed through academic circles
for some time, and was part of a larger debate on development policy. In
the 1980s, economists had argued that developing nations' persistent
problems of poverty were the result of their "debt overhang," thereby
extending a basic insight of corporate finance to apply to the context of
sovereign debt.8 6 In corporate contexts, "debt overhang" referred to the
idea that high levels of indebtedness could stultify a firm by rendering it
unable to borrow (or raise equity) to finance an otherwise profitable
project because funders feared that the debtor might later be unable

85. KRUEGER, supranote 1, at 11-12.
86. See generally Ishac Diwan & Dani Rodrik, Debt Reduction, Adjustment Lending,
and Burden Sharing (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4007, 1992),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w4007.pdf (analyzing the issue of debt overhang
with reference to various economists who had weighed in on the debate).
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both to repay them and earlier lenders.87 Paul Krugman argued that
sovereign debt overhang also limited growth, although he referred in
this context to the effects of excessive sovereign debt on developing
countries' economic growth; on this basis, Krugman argued that
sovereign countries' debt overhang problems should be resolved, either
through debt forgiveness or refinancing and restructuring of that debt.88
Jeffrey Sachs similarly argued that developing countries' debt overhang
limited their growth and would continue to have deleterious effects on
89
development unless excess debt was forgiven. This idea quickly took
hold in international circles, and by 1989 the IMF's World Economic
90
Overlook purported to support this claim empirically.
intractable poverty
countries'
Not everyone agreed that developing
was the result of debt overhang or that it should be remedied through
broad forgiveness or restructuring of sovereign debts. Economists at the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
91
published a report questioning the IMF's data analysis on the topic.
92
Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff also fervently opposed the ideas.
Bulow and Rogoff argued that sovereign debtors differed from corporate
ones and that resolution of their "debt overhang" should also be
93
distinct.
Until the IMF proposed its SDRM, debate about whether sovereign
debt did or did not create debt overhang problems and whether, like
corporate debt overhang, these problems were better resolved through
restructuring or forgiving this debt or by letting the market take its

87. See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 147,
152-55 (1977). Corporate debt restructuring, whether the voluntary contractual sort or
mandatory statutory sort like that found in Chapter 11, is understood to resolve the
problem of debt overhang. See, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or
Bailouts?,35 J. CORP. L. 469, 476 (2010).
88. See Paul Krugman, Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang, 29 J. DEV. EcON.
253, 254-55, 262-63 (1988). In another paper, Krugman argued that market based debt
reductions measures were unlikely to work; because he understood there to be "no
Chapter XI" for sovereign borrowers, Krugman viewed debt forgiveness as the better of
the available options. See Paul R. Krugman, Market-Based Debt-Reduction Schemes 9-10
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2587, 1988).
89. See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Sachs, Conditionality,Debt Relief, and the Developing Country
Debt Crisis, in 1 DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEBT AND ECON. PERFORMANCE, VOLUME 1: THE
INT'L FIN. SYSTEM 255, 257-258 (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 1989).
90. IMF, A Survey by the Staff of the InternationalMonetary Fund, World Economic
Outlook 52-54 (Apr. 1989).
91. See Bert Hofman & Helmut Reisen, Debt Overhang, Liquidity Constraint and
Adjustment Incentives 11-12 (Organisation for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. Ctr., Working
Paper No. 32, 1990).
92. See Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, Cleaning Up Third World Debt Without
Getting Taken to the Cleaners, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 31, 35-36 (1990).
93. Id.
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course, had remained a debate about developing countries' sovereign
debt obligations. Debate among Krugman, Sachs, and Bulow and Rogoff
about sovereign debt and development policy had largely focused on the
debt owed by poor and underdeveloped nations, but the Asian Financial
Crisis had implicated developed nations like Korea and emerging
economies like Malaysia. References to this debate in the G-22's report
on lessons learned from the Asian Financial Crisis had shifted this
conversation to one with a far broader application-the restructuring of
sovereign debt owed, not just by the poorest nations, but also those
countries whose indebtedness had grown as a consequence of the
financial crisis. The list of applicable countries, and the amount of debt
at stake, had substantially expanded with the G-22 report.
What had also shifted was an understanding that sovereign debt
crises might have systemic implications. The Asian Financial Crisis had
raised awareness of the interconnectedness of debt and financial
distress and the systemic implications of these connections. Moreover,
comparison of sovereign debt restructuring to corporate restructuring
and reorganization served to emphasize this relationship.
Commentators had long understood that bank failures-that is,
financial crises-might lead to unsustainable sovereign debt. To prevent
a run on the bank, a nation might ex ante guarantee depositors' claims
up to some maximum or ex post bail out a teetering bank. Whether ex
ante or ex post, commitments to save domestic financial institutions
might strain public coffers, creating in turn a sovereign debt crisis.
The G-22's report also connected corporate insolvency to bank
insolvency. If a large portion of the commercial loans held on the
balance sheet of a systemically important bank were uncollectable,
these nonperforming loans (NPLs) might in turn trigger insecurity
about the bank's solvency. In part, the G-22, various IFIs, and the UN's
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) sought to
promulgate international standards on corporate insolvency law as a
way to prevent corporate debt problems from creating a financial
crisis. 94 In doing so, they pointed to U.S. Chapter 11 as an exemplary
model. Why then should Chapter 11 not also serve as a model for
international standards on resolution of sovereign debt problems?
Thus, the IMF's reliance on the metaphor of Chapter 11 can also
partly be explained for its political resonance, but not in a
straightforward sense. Politically, the debate about sovereign debt
overhang had been marginalized somewhat in that, before the Asian
Financial Crisis, sovereign debt restructuring had been viewed as a

94. See, e.g.,
note 2.

HALLIDAY &

CARRUTHERS, supra note 2; Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra
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"developing country problem" that only peripherally involved the largest
economies. But this view changed with the Asian Financial Crisis. The
speed with which the Crisis had unfolded surprised many; the breadth
of the interconnectedness of financial markets it revealed meant that, as
painful as the Asian Financial Crisis had been, it could have been far
worse. That policy makers felt the need to react to the Crisis through an
expanded network of financial regulators-a G-22 and not simply a G7-and that this network of experts focused so immediately on
preventing "the next crisis" suggests that conversation about sovereign
debt restructuring was no longer considered to be just a "developing
country problem."
Discussion of the systemic implications of sovereign indebtedness
(or, indeed, of corporate or other sorts of debt) was tempered by framing
this conversation in terms of the economic and financial implications of
debt overhang. The language was dry, the symbolism mathematic.
Economists at the various IFIs would immediately appreciate the
implications of this reference, but few others shared this understanding.
Extending the metaphor to compare the proposed SDRM to Chapter 11
corporate reorganization also extended the scope of the audience to
whom this proposal was directed. Now lawyers, and particularly elite
lawyers engaged in a global cross-border insolvency practice, were in on
the debate.
The logic that connected corporate and sovereign debt restructuring
also benefited this debate on an SDRM because, by the time Krueger's
report on the SDRM was published, enormous progress had been made
on a broad-based agreement on international standards for corporate
insolvency reform. By 1999, the IMF's legal team had fleshed out the
contours of the G-22 proposal with its tract on "Orderly & Effective
Insolvency Systems." 95 By 2001, the World Bank had released an initial
draft of its "Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and
Creditor Rights System." 96 When Krueger's report was published,
UNCITRAL was adding the final touches to what would become its
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law. 97 Implicitly, if corporate

95. See IMF Legal Dep't, supra note 59.
96. The World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor
Rights Systems (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/ipg-eng.pdf. By
2005, the World Bank had revised its first draft of these Principles and Guidelines. See
The World Bank, Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (2005),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/Resources/FINA.L-ICRPrinciplesMarch2009.pdf (revising the 2001 principles based on experience and feedback from the
World Bank's international partner organizations).
97. UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, supranote 59. Indeed, Krueger's
discussion of the proposed SDRM referred to these international texts as having set
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restructurings modeled on U.S. Chapter 11 presented international
standards on the resolution of unsustainable corporate debt, so too
might these laws also serve as a model for the restructuring of
unsustainable sovereign debt. If UNCITRAL and other international
organizations could succeed in drafting international standards in the
corporate context, an international solution for sovereign debt
restructuring seemed more plausible.
Reference to corporate reorganization law as a model for sovereign
debt restructuring was also politically appealing because the case for
corporate rescue and restructuring often is painted as win-win
situation. A Chapter 11 plan of reorganization is only confirmed if the
court agrees that it is in the "best interest of creditors"-that is, if no
objecting creditor would have been better off in the event of the debtor's
liquidation. 98 The notion is that creditors are no worse off as a result of
the confirmed plan of reorganization, and might even be better off-the
"pie" might get bigger-since the debtor might be willing to share with
its creditors a portion of the benefits it receives from remaining in
operation post confirmation. 99
As a result, the case for corporate restructuring is not a
distributional one. Creditors may object to the delay and administrative
expense of a Chapter 11 case, but in theory at least they should have no
basis for complaining that reorganization is financed on the backs of the
debtor's (unsecured or secured) creditors. Not only do these same
creditors "do no worse" as a result of the delay, in that they receive no
less than they would have in a liquidation scenario, arguably they
should also "do better" in that any excess above liquidation value they
receive comes out of a going concern value that belongs to the debtor
100
and not the creditors.
A similar rhetoric framed the case for SDRM. In her speech before
the European Commission in 2002, Krueger argued that sovereign
creditors would receive more under an SDRM than they otherwise
would have.10 1 Because holdouts may unravel a sovereign debt

international standards on the topic of corporate reorganization law. See KRUEGER, supra
note 1, at 12-13.
98. For codification of best interest of creditors standard, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)
(2013).

99. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of the Government:
Whose Money Is It Anyway? 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993, 1005-06 (1995).
100. Id.
101. See Krueger, supra note 65, at Part V ("At present, the threat of a disorderly
workout means that the value of creditor claims falls more sharply on the secondary
market when a country gets into trouble than it would likely do in a more predictable
environment. A framework that allows creditors to preserve better the value of their
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restructuring, Krueger argued that an SDRM's restraint of dissenting
02
holdouts would maximize social welfare.'
But this argument misses the point, to some degree. In the context
of a Chapter 11 reorganization, every creditor is guaranteed a
distribution that is no worse than what it is otherwise legally entitled to
recover. On this basis, Chapter 11 is described as win-win situation. But
sovereign creditors could not receive a similar assurance under an
SDRM. Moreover, sovereign debtors cannot promise their lenders a
share of their going concern valuation since this differential is unlikely
to exist in a sovereign setting. Each sovereign creditor is legally entitled
to payment in full, and an SDRM would enforce some lesser recovery.
Viewed from this perspective, an SDRM held distributional
consequences absent in a corporate reorganization.
There was another set of distributional consequences hovering in
the background of the SDRM debate: IMF bailouts had frustrated many,
both in the U.S. Department of the Treasury and within the IMF
leadership. 103 IMF bailouts were viewed as problematic not just because
they might create moral hazard problems for both sovereign borrowers
(who delayed proposing a resolution to sovereign debt problems in the
hope that the IMF would bail out) and sovereign creditors (who held out
from agreeing to a proposed restructuring in the hope of a bailout), but
also because a bailout shifted costs onto the shoulders of the IMF's
creditor countries-those countries whose contributions to the IMF are
available for distribution. Critics of IMF bailouts "saw an international
bankruptcy regime that would provide sovereigns with additional legal
protection during a debt restructuring as an alternative to big IMF
bailouts" and, thus, "as a means to scale back large IMF rescue loans
104
and to force the IMF to return to its traditional lending limits."
Comparing the SDRM to a U.S. Chapter 11 reorganization hid, to some
extent, debate on the distributional implications of a bailout. Bailouts
were not on the corporate reorganization radar screen.
Thus, the metaphor of a failing corporation proved to be powerful,
but not powerful enough to rebut claims that a statutory (that is, a
mandatory) SDRM presented an unnecessary intrusion on national
sovereignty when contractual means were likely to resolve the collective
action problems that inhered in sovereign debt restructuring. These
clauses would not bind creditors covered by bonds that did not have
such clauses, but the sovereign debt market had by 2003 settled into a
claims and debtors to minimize output losses during the restructuring period helps both
creditors and debtors.").
102. KRUEGER, supra note 1, at 8.
103. Radelet & Sachs, supra note 54, at 142-49.
104. Setser, supra note 6, at 319.
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groove that seemed to accept the status quo as good enough. 105
Nevertheless, this sanguine perspective would last only several years.
III. REVISITING SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING AS THE CURRENT
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS RECEDES
The Global Financial Crisis began in the United States in 2007 and
2008. As risky subprime mortgages defaulted at unexpected rates
beginning in mid-2006 and 2007,106 U.S. subprime mortgage finance
companies filed for bankruptcy, causing highly leveraged securitization
arrangements to default and creating further uncertainties in markets
for prime residential mortgages, in markets for all sorts of asset-back
securities, and eventually in the liquidity of global capital markets more
generally. Liquidity constraints emanating from the United States
stressed systemically important members of global financial markets,
including banks and nonbanks alike.
In early reaction to the current Global Financial Crisis, the U.S.
Congress reluctantly agreed to ratify a Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) proposed first by the Bush administration and later by the
Obama administration. The U.S. government provided emergency
financial backing to some entities (a wide range of national banks,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, American International Group (AIG),
General Motors (GM), and Chrysler), while others were pushed into
private sales occurring inside (IndyMac, Lehman Brothers) and outside
(Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Countrywide Mortgage) the U.S.
bankruptcy system. TARP funding was used to bolster some financial
institutions (that is, national banks) and protect depositors (that is,
bank creditors favored under the law) in the United States, as well as to
bailout other systemically important financial and nonfinancial actors
(like AIG, Chrysler and GM). But access to this funding was withheld
from others (like Lehman). For those unable to obtain TARP funding
(like Lehman), Chapter 11 offered some solace.
Debate on the wisdom of these bailouts, and whether bankruptcy
(either liquidation or reorganization) of these entities should have been

105. See generally G-30, supra note 5.
106. For discussion of the factors leading to understatement of the risks associated with
securitized subprime residential mortgages, see generally Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J.
Janger, Demand-Side Gatekeepers in the Market for Home Loans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 465
(2009) (discussing agency problems in the market for securitized home loans and the
resulting need for consumer protection and consumer education to protect the integrity of
the market).
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preferred, divided lawmakers and pundits.107 Especially following
midterm elections in the first term of the Obama administration,
Republican lawmakers pushed against full implementation of TARP
funding and toward increased austerity.108
Banks and corporations were not the only actors left financially
distressed in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. The crisis had
begun as a foreclosure crisis in the United States, and as a result,
defaulting borrowers often found themselves enmeshed in foreclosure
actions in one of fifty state courts. While some argued that U.S.
bankruptcy law should be amended to permit modification of residential
mortgage terms in the context of a Chapter 13 debt-repayment plan,
Congress was convinced that banks' wholesale "marking to market" of
residential mortgage would trigger greater financial crisis.10 9 Instead,
the U.S. government put in place monetary incentives for certain banks
to modify residential mortgages voluntarily through the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and the Home Affordable
Refinance Program (HARP), but banks' disinterest in refinancing
underwater mortgages meant that the success of these programs grew
only slowly. 110 Foreclosures lingered in state courts for years. As a
result, many U.S. homeowners' residential mortgages were neither
bailed out with TARP money nor restructured with HAMP money.
Failures within the financial services industries leapt from the
United States to the United Kingdom to Iceland and back to the United
States. In this context, too, bank failure caused and was caused by
household debt problems. The failure of the U.K. bank, Northern Rock,
caused financial turmoil within Icelandic banks. Within Iceland, bank
failures triggered a financial crisis and currency imbalance, which
11
triggered defaults in residential mortgages and other consumer debts."

107. See generally Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 87 (discussing the debate between
bankruptcy and government-orchestrated rescue systems).
108. Sharon Otterman, Republicans Are Resistant to Obama's Stimulus Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/O1/26/us/politics/26talkshow.html? r=O.
109. For discussion of Dodd-Frank and its legislative history, see Susan Block-Lieb &
Edward J. Janger, Reforming Regulation in the Markets for Home Loans, 38 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 681, 698-99 (2011).
110. See, e.g., TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES
302, 376 (2014); see also Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis:
Lessons from the Lackluster First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program
(HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 752, 786 (2010); see also Alan M. White & Carolina Reid,
Saving Homes? Bankruptcies and Loan Modifications in the Foreclosure Crisis, 65 FLA. L.
REV. 1713, 1719, 1726-27 (2013).
111. See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, After Crisis, Iceland Holds a Tight Grip on Its Banks,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (Jan. 15, 2014, 6:47 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/
after-crisis-iceland-holds-a-tight-grip-on-its-banks/.
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Never before had consumer credit assumed systemic consequences,
but Iceland's household debt problems were both caused by their
financial and sovereign debt crises and further hampered resolving
either. Icelandic household debts had been pegged in currencies other
than the Icelandic kroner-Euro, Yen, and U.S. dollars-because
Icelandic banks had hoped to match these loans with the currency
denomination of deposit accounts. 12 When Iceland's balance of
payments roiled in reaction to bank failures in those currencies'
countries, Icelandic consumers were pulled into a vortex of North
Atlantic financial troubles. This meant that much Icelandic mortgage
debt and consumer credit constituted NPLs on Icelandic banks' balance
sheets, which in turn made Icelandic banks' financial crises difficult to
resolve without resolution of this household debt problem.
When the G-20 met in Washington, D.C. in November 2008 "amid
serious challenges to the world economy and financial markets," 113 the
Global Financial Crisis had just begun, leaving this newly reconfigured
Club of Nations somewhat flatfooted. Despite the threat to global
financial markets, the G-20's message did not alter much from earlier
meetings. At its meeting in the fall of 2008, the G-20 leaders pledged
"closer macroeconomic cooperation, to restore growth, avoid negative
spillovers and support emerging market economics and developing
countries," but also, as with its earlier efforts to enhance the global
financial architecture, the G-20 committed to "strengthen[ing] financial
markets and regulatory regimes so as to avoid future crises." 114 Like
similar commitments made following the Asian Financial Crisis, the G20 committed to a strengthening of financial market transparency,
"including by enhancing required disclosure on complex financial
products and ensuring complete and accurate disclosure by firms of
their financial conditions,"'115 and a strengthening of "regulatory
regimes, prudential oversight, and risk management." ' 1 6 It also
112. See, e.g., Jochen R. Andritzky, Resolving Residential Mortgage Distress: Time to
Modify? 5 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/14/226, 2014) ("A 50 percent devaluation of the
[Icelandic] krona in 2008 was followed by many household loan defaults, particularly of
CPI indexed or foreign currency linked mortgages.").
113. Grp. of Twenty [G-20], Declaration of the Summit on FinancialMarkets and the
World Economy, para. 1 (Nov. 15, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/ga/president63/
commissionldeclarationG20.pdf. The G-20 had met between 1999 and 2007, but these
interim meetings were sideshows to the G-8 summits, merely opportunities for central
bankers and financial regulators from the 22 largest economies to assess progress that the
Financial Stability Forum had achieved on the Global Financial Architecture project.
When the G-20 met in 2008, the group had changed. This time, unlike earlier meetings,
the leaders of the 20 largest economies met.
114. Id. at paras. 7-8.
115. Id. at para. 9.
116. Id.
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committed to promote integrity in financial markets "by bolstering
investor and consumer protection."' 117 Unlike its silence on the topic in
1998, the G-20 also proposed reforms of the Bretton Woods Institutions
and in the Financial Stability Forum so that emerging and developing
countries would hold greater voice and representation in these
entities. 118 Most reminiscent of the G-22's report in 1998, the G-20
committed in 2008 to an "action plan" that closely resembled its earlier
financial architecture plan. It proposed structural reforms on seven
issue areas. 119
However, the G-20 said little to nothing in this 2008 report on the
need for structural reform of insolvency laws, and was completely silent
on whether international standards on the modification of residential
120
mortgages or otherwise could resolve consumers' over-indebtedness.
In addition, the G-20 was silent on the issue of sovereign debt
restructuring at early stages of the Global Financial Crisis. In 2008 and
early 2009, the view was that this was largely a financial and not a
sovereign debt crisis, 121 a view altered within the year. Just as the G20's 2009 meeting was getting under way, the Greek government

117. Id.
118. Id. By 2009, the G-20 reports emphasized the need to reconstitute and restructure
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) as a more permanent Financial Stability Board
(FSB). G-20, The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, para. 14 (Apr. 2, 2009). It issued a
declaration, entitled "Strengthening the Financial System," which pledged to establish a
new Financial Stability Board composed of "all G20 countries, FSF members, Spain and
the European Commission" and tasked the IMF to collaborate with the FSB to "provide
early warning of macroeconomic and financial risks and the actions needed to address
them." Id. at para. 15.
119. G-20, Declaration of the Summit on FinancialMarkets and the World Economy,
supra note 113, para. following para. 16 (strengthening transparency and accountability,
enhancing sound regulation, prudential oversight, risk management, promoting integrity
in financial matters, reinforcing international cooperation, and reforming international
financial institutions).
120. Whereas reform of corporate insolvency and creditor-debtor regimes had in the past
figured prominently in the project to strengthen the global financial architecture, there
was virtually no mention of bankruptcy within the 2008 report of the G-20. See id.
(providing that, within medium-term actions relating to enhancing of sound regulation,
"national and regional authorities should review resolution regimes and bankruptcy laws
in light of recent experience to ensure that they permit an orderly wind-down of large
complex cross-border financial institutions"); see also Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra note 2,
at 17.
121. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra note 2, at 18. To be sure, Iceland sought rescue
funding from the IMF in November 2008, but the IMF had succeeded in quickly injecting
funds there, thus cordoning off Iceland's default from the rest of world. See id. On the
relationship between financial crises and sovereign debt crises, see generally Christoph G.
Paulus, The Interrelationship of Sovereign Debt and Distressed Banks: A European
Perspective, 49 TEX. INTL L.J. 201 (2014).
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announced enormous budget deficits.1 22 Although this announcement
did not itself constitute a default under the terms of its sovereign debt,
the deficits nonetheless exceeded permissible levels specified under
123
standards set by the European Union.
By the time of the G-20's 2009 meeting in London, the G-20
countries agreed to an "unprecedented and concerted fiscal expansion"
of five trillion dollars. 124 The United States was not alone in providing
monetary assistance to systemically important financial entities-the
European Central Bank, the U.S. Federal Reserve System, the Bank of
England, and the Central Banks for Australia, Canada, Japan and
others all injected money into the global financial system early in the
crisis. 125 But this was not to be a long-lasting commitment to public debt
as a means of averting global economic depression. When Greece later
looked to the European Union for continued financial support, these
requests were met with demands that the Greek government contain its
crisis through greater austerity. Riots broke out in the streets of Athens.
Although in 2009 Greece's sovereign debt problems may have felt
predominantly like European problems and not a fully "global" financial
crisis, the severity of Greece's financial problems and the full extent of
the interconnectedness of Greece with European and, indeed, global
financial markets quickly revealed themselves. Greek sovereign debt
ratings decreased in the spring of 2010 to "junk bond" levels, which
created fears that Greece would default on its debts. 126 The depth and
breadth of European banks' Greek debt holdings caused markets to
speculate on the extent to which a Greek default might create a wider
European crisis. 127 Spain's sovereign debt ratings were downgraded in
the spring of 2010.128
By May 2010, the IMF, European Central Bank, and European
Commission jointly announced a $146 billion rescue package containing
122. David Jolly, 2009 Greek Deficit Revised Higher, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/201O/11/16/business/global/16deficit.html.
123. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra note 2, at 18. Moreover, Greece's sovereign debt
ratings fell as a result of this announcement. See id.
124. G-20, London Summit - Leaders' Statement, para. 6 (Apr. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pdf/g20O 040209.pdf.
125. See IMF, Global Economic Policies and Prospects, Group of 20 Meeting of the
Ministers and Central Bank Governors, March 13-14, 2009, London, U.K. (2009),
available at https://www.imf.orglexternal/np/g20/pdf/031909a.pdf.
126. Chavon Sutton, S&P Downgrades Greek Debt to Junk Status, CNN MONEY (Apr.
27, 2010, 1:52 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/04/27/news/international/Greece-debL
downgraded/.
127. Landon Thomas Jr., Europeans Fear Greek Debt Crisis Will Spread, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/business/global/28euro.html?dbk.
128. Julianne Pepitone, Fitch Slashes Spain's Credit Rating, CNN MONEY (May 28,
2010, 3:39 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/05/28/news/economy/spain-downgraded/.
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129
substantial commitments of austerity from the Greek government.
"Substantial official funds were at first used to repay private creditors
under the assumption that Greek debt would be sustainable-Greece
130
would repay all its debt including official loans."
However, the terms of the Greek financing satisfied few. Market
actors complained that the Troika had waited too long to extend
financial assistance and had provided too little in the way of loan
proceeds. Others, especially Greeks, complained that the Troika had not
conditioned the provision of these funds on a restructuring of Greek
bonds. As a result, many argued that while rescue financing to Greece
had protected bondholders, it had done so by pushing the cost of
131
Greece's rescue financing on EU members (and their taxpayers).

Some argued that this loan structure violated treaty obligations
prohibiting public bailouts within the European Union.1 32 Because the
IMF's policies required it to find that the rescued country's debt is
sustainable before lending under its "exceptional access" criteria, others
argued that the rescue package was little more than a bailout and, as
such, would undermine principles of austerity and encourage sovereigns
to engage in risky borrowing without fear of harsh consequences.1 33
Developing nations agreed with this critique on the grounds that the
"systemic exemption" to exceptional access standards favored rescue of
large, developed nations over smaller, developing ones, and also on the

129. Gabi Thesing & Flavia Krause-Jackson, Greece Gets $146 Billion Rescue in EU,
IMFPackage, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 3, 2010, 4:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?sid=aqUKEXajkSzk&pid--newsarchive.
130. Ashoka Mody, Sovereign Debt and Its RestructuringFramework in the Eurozone, 29
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 715, 727 (2013).
131. See, e.g., Charlemagne, Europe Agrees a "Shock and Awe" Bailout for Greece, THE
ECONOMIST (May 2, 2010), http://www.economist.com~blogs/charlemagne/201O/O5/eu
rescuegreece (editorial contending that Greek restructuring "still looks horribly likely"
despite rescue financing and that when default occurs "EU Political leaders will find
themselves explaining to voters not just why they had to bail out Greece, but why that
money may never be repaid in full, or even at all.").
132. Mody, supra note 130, at 727 ("Early on, starting with Greece, the decision was to
make private creditors whole. Since that required substantial official funding for
distressed sovereigns, new official financing mechanisms were set up. Whether the
funding channeled through such mechanisms violates the no bailout required by the
[Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] has been a continuing source of
angst.").
133. See, e.g., Silvia Ardagna & Francesco Caselli, The Political Economy of the Greek
Debt Crisis: A Tale of Two Bailouts 9 (Jan. 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
the London School of Economics).
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grounds that the exemption was inherently ad hoc "since almost
134
anything can be made to seem systemic."
The IMF's interest in the sustainability of sovereign borrowing was
neither new nor simply rhetorical. The IMF's Articles of Agreement
prohibit it from lending to finance "a large or sustained outflow of
capital,"'1 5 and it has long struggled to rationalize its assessments of
sustainable sovereign borrowing and the conditions it imposes on such
loans; these conditions may include requirements of sovereign debt
restructuring because lending at a time when a sovereign borrower has
already exhibited debt problems complicates a finding of the
sustainability of this debt.1 36 In 2002 the IMF adopted an "exceptional
access" policy, conditioning certain sovereign lending on demonstration
of 'a high probability that the country's public debt is sustainable in the
medium term' and 'a reasonably strong prospect of success' for the
137
economic program.
The IMF's exceptional access policy was meant to work like a
precommitment device, limiting the Fund's temptation to structure help
to a sovereign borrower as a loan when, in reality, the extension should
be viewed as more of a bailout given the unsustainability of the lending.
But like many precommitment devices, it failed. When the Greek
government asked the IMF and EU officials for assistance at the height
of the Global Financial Crisis, the IMF developed a "systemic" exception
to this "exceptional access" policy.138 Rather than ask Greece's sovereign
creditors for debt forgiveness or changes in the terms of repayment, the
Troika "lent" monies to Greece. Greek sovereign borrowers were told
they should tell their citizens that they should expect fewer public
39
services or higher taxes or both.
By the time the G-20 next met in Toronto in June of 2010, the
leaders of the twenty largest economies disagreed fundamentally on the

134. See Robin Harding, IM1F Discusses Third Way Over Bailouts, FINANCIAL TIMES
(June 15, 2014), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/713abdb8-f4a9-11e3-bf6e00144feabdcO.html#axzz3UGp5LXhO.
135. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. VI, § 1(a), adopted
July 22, 1944, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/.
136. See, e.g., JAMES BOUGHTON ET AL., IMF LENDING PRACTICES AND SOVEREIGN DEBT

RESTRUCTURING 1 (2014).
137. Id. at 5.
138. IMF, Greece: Ex Post Evaluation of Exceptional Access under the 2010 Stand-By
Arrangement, Country Report No. 12/156, at 1 (June 2013), available at http://www.imf.
org/external/pubs/ftscr/2013/cr13156.pdf.
139. See Jane Lethbridge, Effects of Austerity on Greece: Financing of Government Debt
and Troika Intervention (Pub. Servs. Int'l, Briefing Paper, Oct. 24, 2013), available at
http://www.worldpsi.org/sites/default/files/documents/research/financing-of government debt.pdf.
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path to economic recovery. 140 Presidents Angela Merkel and Nicolas
Sarkozy argued that further rescue funding would only be available if
borrowing nations agreed to stringent austerity measures;14 ' President
Obama and others argued that stimulus was important to counteract
the social impacts of recession.142
Like most intractable debates, this one was rooted in ideology. John
Maynard Keynes famously had remarked a generation earlier that, "the
boom, not the slump, is the right time for austerity,"'143 but Keynes'
claim that governments should spend their way out of economic crises
was steadfastly rejected by fiscal conservatives during the Great
Depression; it was rejected anew during the Global Financial Crisis. For
some, the comparison of a sovereign nation to an overstrapped
household was impossible to set aside. "At that 2010 summit in Toronto,
Germany prevailed over US objections by getting wealthier economies to
commit to halving their budget deficits by 2013 and to 'stabilize,' or
reduce, their debt by 2016."'144 Another summit, this time between
Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy in Deauville in October 2010,
resulted in commitments to ease sovereign debt restructuring through
more widespread use of collective action clauses in newly issued
European bond contracts and through commitments to condition official
assistance from the European Stability Mechanism on the restructuring
145
of privately held sovereign debt.
That this had become a truly global financial and sovereign debt
crisis had become perfectly clear by the time the G-20 leaders met in
Cannes in November 2011. Weeks after the G-20 meeting in Seoul in
November 2010, the Troika announced a $114 billion rescue package to
Ireland. By May 2011, it pledged a nearly identical amount to Portugal.
The Memoranda of Understanding negotiated with Ireland, Greece, and
Portugal specified the need for structural reform of insolvency laws,
including in some cases specific reference to the desirability of

140. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes & Sewell Chan, Leaders at Summit Turn Attention to
Deficit Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/27fbusiness/
globall27summit.html (describing debate between stimulus and austerity supporters at G20 leaders' summit in Toronto).
141. Leo Cendrowicz, How Austerity Is Tearing Apart the G-20, TIME (June 24, 2010),
http://content.time.comltime/world/article/O,8599,1999444,00.html.
142. See Calmes & Chan, supra note 140; id.
143. 21 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, ACTIVITIES 1931-1939: WORLD CRISES AND POLICIES IN

BRITAIN AND AMERICA 390 (Donald Moggridge ed., The Macmillan Press, Ltd. 1982)
(1937).
144. Thomas Catan & Anton Troianovski, G-20 Finance Chiefs See Growth as Priority
Over Austerity, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2013, 2:21 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1
0001424127887324144304578619880872056430.
145. See Mody, supranote 130, at 733.
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reforming the laws governing consumer bankruptcy or the like, 146
although there were no clear international standards for consumer
bankruptcy. UNCITRAL's Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law was
explicitly limited to debtors with economic activity, thus excluding
consumers. 147 The World Bank did not issue its report on the insolvency
treatment of natural persons until early 2014, and even then its report
included lengthy discussion of the issues but did not include
recommendations. 148 In recommending structural reform of consumer
bankruptcy laws, the IMF staff were shooting from the hip 149 and, as a
result, countries pushed back against these recommendations. 150
In July 2011, the IMF and EU officials agreed to the terms for
restructuring Greece's rescue financing. 151 The G-20's 2011 report
conceded that "global recovery [had] weakened, particularly in advanced

146. See, e.g., Portugal: Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy
Conditionality, paras. 2.17-2.22, May 17, 2011, available at http://ec.europa.eueconomyfinance/euborrower/mou2011-05-18-mou-portugal-en.pdf;
Ireland: Memorandum
of
Economic
and Financial Policies, para. 16, July 12, 2010, available at
http://ec.europa.eueconomy-finance/articles/eu_economic-situation/pdf/201012-07mefp-en.pdf.
147. See UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, supra note 59, at 38
(describing the Guide as assisting "in designing an insolvency law focused on debtors
engaged in economic activities" and in a lengthy footnote broadly defining "economic
activity").
148. See generally World Bank, Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural
Persons (Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Regimes Task Force, Working Paper No.
ACS6818, 2014), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDS
ContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/O1/23/000333037_2014012312311 1[Rendered/PDF/ACS681
80WPOP12OBoxO382094BOOPUBLICO.pdf.
149. See generally Yan Liu & Christoph B. Rosenberg, Dealing with Private Debt
Distress in the Wake of the European Financial Crisis: A Review of the Economics and
Legal Toolbox (IMF, Working Paper No. 13/44, 2013), available at http://www.imf.org/
externa/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1344.pdf (listing several factors, among them the lack of
international best practices regarding such restructurings, that make these restructurings
difficult endeavors).
150. See, e.g., Joseph Spooner, Sympathy for the Debtor? The Modernisation of Irish
PersonalInsolvency Law, 25(7) INSOLVENCY INTELLIGENCE 97, 97 (2012); Francisco Javier
Arias Varona, Financial Crisis in Spain and Consumer Protection in the Absence of
Special Rules for Consumer Insolvency, Unpublished Manuscript (May 2013) (on file with
author); F. Javier Arias Varona, Debtor, What Debtor?, CREDIT SLIPS (Feb. 16, 2014, 4:49
PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/02/the-recent-world-bank-report-on-thetreatment-of-the-insolvency-of-natural-persons-highlighted-in-its-first-pages- 13-andff.html; F. Javier Arias Varona, Spain, Six Years Later, CREDIT SLIPS (Feb. 12, 2014, 6:20
AM),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/02/first-of-all-i-would-like-to-thank-thecredit-slips-team-and-in-particular-bob-lawless-for-hosting-me.here-again-i-guess.html.
151. See IMF, COUNTRY REPORT NO. 11/175: GREECE: FOURTH REVIEW UNDER THE
STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT AND REQUEST FOR MODIFICATION AND WAIVER OF APPLICABILITY
OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 1 (2011).
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countries, leaving unemployment at unacceptable levels."'152 In addition,
the depth of the European financial crisis had begun to affect global
markets more broadly. Adding to their reference to problems in the
United States and Europe, the G-20 Leaders' Statement also noted
"signs of vulnerabilities" in emerging markets. 153
The G-20 reacted to this expansion of difficulties by combining
agreements on general economic and policy goals with a restatement of
earlier calls for financial sector reforms. 154 But still, the list of
recommendations was, in important respects, limited. Although the G20 ratified "high level principles" on consumer financial protection and
financial education, the G-20 remained silent on the need for
international standards on consumer bankruptcy laws and residential
55
mortgage modification. 1
While the 2010 commitment to austerity held firm in 2011 and
2012, it changed importantly over the next few years. Before the leaders
of the G-20 economies met in Los Cabos, Mexico, in June 2012, the
European Union and IMF announced rescue funding for Spain, but on
terms noticeably less stringent in its demands for austerity. The Troika
restructured Greek bonds in 2012, but did so on terms that required
bondholders to share in the financial pain. "[T]he decision was to stretch
out the repayment of Greece's official debt repayment obligations with
the goal of lowering its debt-to-GDP ratio to about 120 per cent about a
decade from now."156 Debate continued on whether the terms of this
extension of the maturity of Greece's obligations were sufficient, with
many viewing the renegotiations as "too little, too late, besides being
grossly unfair." 15 7 Perhaps in response to the perceived unfairness of
extensions of Greece's obligations, the Troika subsequently agreed to
"significant cumulative reduction in the Irish and Portuguese debt
158
burdens through extended maturities and lower interest rates."'
Despite concerns that Greek sovereign debt was unsustainable, the
restructuring of Greek bonds was delayed largely out of fear that
restructuring would trigger possible contagion effects. Banks in
Germany, France, Belgium, and elsewhere in Europe held Greek bonds;
152. G-20 Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Cannes, Fr., Nov. 4,
2011, Cannes Summit FinalDeclaration,para. 1.
153. See id.
154. See id. at paras. 22-34.
155. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra note 2, at 3.
156. Mody, supranote 130, at 728.
157. Id. "Given the sorry track record of macro projections in the first 2 years of the
Greek programme, the claim that Greece would hit that precise debt ratio several years
down the line was a political outcome rather than reflecting credible economic analysis."

Id.
158. Id.
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it was feared that private sector involvement in the restructuring of
Greek sovereign bonds would trigger financial crises elsewhere. 159 In the
end, the terms of this restructuring hit Cypriot banks the hardest
160
It
within the eurozone, triggering a sovereign debt crisis there.
prompted both a Cypriot financial crisis and a Cypriot sovereign debt
crisis. While resolution of circumstances in Cyprus took, in at least one
view, too long, the terms of the assistance provided through the Troika
differed importantly from that in other eurozone countries 161-unlike
the terms of any other financial assistance provided to a member of the
European Union, the restructuring of Cypriot sovereign bonds and
recapitalization of Cypriot banks were conditioned on the so-called "bail162
in" by the unsecured depositors of these banks.
With the resolution of the Cypriot sovereign debt crisis, return to
normal economic circumstances seemed plausible. Slowly over 2013, the
U.S. economy began to grow more quickly than those of its European
trading partners, lending support for the proposition that European
policies of austerity had stifled recoveries there.
By the time of the meeting of financial leaders held in St.
Petersburg in July 2013, the G-20's austerity commitment had changed:
the G-20 instead emphasized that their 'near-term priority is to boost
jobs and growth." '163 Although German delegates pushed in this setting
for a commitment that would prompt governments to define mediumterm targets for the period after 2016 to encourage "sustainable growth"
not financed by borrowing, other countries in Europe and China
prevailed in contending that policies fostering growth in the near term
were more important. 164 G-20 leaders again emphasized support for
growth over austerity in the declaration emanating out of meeting in St.
Petersburg in September 2013,165 and in Brisbane in November 2014.166

159. See Thomas, supra note 127.
160. See Zenios, supra note 16, at 18. While the Greek restructuring imposed losses on
Cypriot banks that were slightly more than those suffered by German banks and less than
those incurred by French banks, when measured as a percentage of the relevant country's
GDP the impact of the Greek PSI was twice as severe on Cypriot banks than even Greek
banks and higher in Cyprus than in any other Eurozone country. See id. Table 4.
161. Two hundred seventy-one days elapsed between the initial memorandum of
understanding between Cyprus and the Troika and final agreement on the terms of rescue
financing provided by the Troika. See id. at 4.
162. See id. at 41.
163. See Catan & Troinovski, supra note 144.
164. See id.
165. G-20, G-20 Leaders' Declaration (Sept. 2013), https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/12/SaintPetersburgDeclarationENG_- 0.pdf.
166. G-20, G-20 Leaders' Communiqu6 (Nov. 2014), https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/12/brisbaneg20_leaders.summitcommunique 1.pdf.

AUSTERITY, DEBT OVERHANG, AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

521

To some extent, shifts in the austerity debate were prompted by
dents that emerged in empirical support for the claim that high levels of
public debt should be tempered. The case for austerity often was
supported by reference to work by two Harvard economists, Carmen
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. Reinhart and Rogoff looked at data on
sovereign debt levels spanning centuries, and concluded that once a
country's sovereign debt crossed the ninety percent debt-to-GDP
threshold, its economic growth plunged. 167 Relying on this finding,
policy makers linked policies of austerity to economic stability in the
crisis context. Several years after publication, however, mistakes were
found in the empirical analysis and Reinhart and Rogoffs findings were
questioned. 168 More recent empirical evidence more directly undermines
assertions that austerity is the best medicine for recovery from a
financial crisis. 169 The most recent of these empirical studies emerged
from economists at the IMF, who found "no evidence of any particular
debt threshold above which medium-term growth prospects are
170
dramatically compromised."
The consensus that collective action problems in sovereign debt
restructurings were best resolved through contractual, and not
statutory, measures also shifted recently. Experience with the
restructuring of Argentinian sovereign bonds, which contained pari
passu clauses (a contractual clause often found in sovereign debt bonds,
but not one that binds dissenting holdouts to the terms of a
167. See Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, 100 AM.
ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 573, 573 (2010).
168. See Thomas Herndon et al., Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Growth? A
Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff 1 (Political Econ. Research Inst.: Univ. of Mass. Amherst,
Working Paper No. 322, April 15, 2013), available at http://www.peri.umass.edul
also
John
See
fileadminlpdf/working-papers/working-papers_301-350/WP322.pdf.
Cassidy, The Reinhart and Rogoff Controversy: A Summing Up, THE NEW YORKER (Apr.
26, 2013), http://www.newyorker.connews/john-cassidy/the-reinhart-and-rogoff-controversya-summing-up (criticizing Reinhart and Rogoff's claim that economic growth ceases once a
certain debt-to-GDP ratio is reached by relying on Herndon paper).
169. See Arindrajit Dube, A Note on Debt, Growth and Causality 1 (May 30, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/15038936/
RR%20Timepath/DubeGrowthDebtCausation.pdf; Miles Kimball & Yichuan Wang,
After Crunching Reinhart and Rogoff's Data, We've Concluded that High Debt Doesn't
Slow Growth, QUARTZ (May 29, 2013), http://qz.com/88781/after-crunching-reinhart-androgoffs-data-weve-concluded-that-high-debt-does-not-cause-low-growthl?oref=dbamerica..
170. Andrea Pescatori et al., Debt and Growth: Is There a Magic Threshold? 2 (IMF,
Working Paper No. WP/14/34, 2014), available at http://www.imf.org/externalipubs/ft
wp/2014/wp1434.pdf. Pescatori, Sandri and Simon qualified their conclusion somewhat,
remarking that the "debt trajectory can be as important as the debt level in understanding
future growth prospects, since countries with high but declining debt appear to grow
equally as fast as countries with lower debt. Notwithstanding this, we find some evidence
that higher debt is associated with a higher degree of output volatility." Id.
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restructuring agreed upon by a supermajority of bond creditors),
suggested to some that contractual means for resolving sovereign
financial distress may not alone be sufficient to promote restructuring
efforts. 171 A string of cases decided by federal courts in New York and
affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court first viewed the old bonds that
were to be tendered by the restructuring participants as sovereign
property subject to execution, and then construed pari passu clauses in
restructured bonds as precluding such payments until dissenting
holdouts were themselves paid in full. 172 Commentators feared that this
precedent might make sovereign debt restructurings more unlikely.1 73
Since New York law governs many sovereign bonds and empowers
dissenters to insist on payment in full of sovereign debts owed to them,
commentators feared that fewer sovereign creditors would agree to the
74
terms of a restructuring.1
With strengthening economic indicators, and with the worst of the
Global Financial Crisis behind us, many looked for lessons learned and
returned their attention to the need for regularization in the treatment
of sovereign debt restructurings. IMF staff have published several
papers in the past couple of years: one, a lengthy literature survey and
data analysis on the topic1 75 and another, a closer examination of
contractual approaches to sovereign debt restructuring, focused
specifically on eurozone restructurings.176 Important reports also

171. See, e.g., BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 13.
172. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S.Ct. 2819 (2014); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246
(2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 201 (2013). The Supreme Court denied certiorari on
these decisions, but is famously remembered for having affirmed another (procedural)
judgment of the Second Circuit. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S.Ct.
2250 (2014), affg 695 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2012) (addressing issue of post-judgment
discovery).
173. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Argentina's Case Has No Victors, Many Losers, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/business/international/in-argentinasdebt-case-no-winners-but-a-lot-of-losers.html? r=O; Jamila Trindle, Argentine Default Bad
Test Case for Sovereign Debt Negotiations, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 24, 2014),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/25/argentine-default-bad-test-case-for-sovereign-debtnegotiations/.
174. See generally BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 13.
175. See Udaibir S. Das et al., Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature
Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 5 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/12/203, 2012), available
at https:llwww.imf.org/external/pubs/ftlwp/2012/wp12203.pdf.
176. See Marco Committeri & Francesco Spadafora, You Never Give Me Your Money?
Sovereign Debt Crises, Collective Action Problems, and IMF Lending 13-16 (IMF, Working
Paper No. WP/13/20, 2013), available at https://www.imf.org/external]pubs/ft/wp/2013/
wp1320.pdf.
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emanated from the Bank of Spain 177 and the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas. 178 Reviewing experience in twelve sovereign debt restructurings,
these reports argued that IMF policies had been flexible but also ad hoc,
and that the lack of clear standards in this context had resulted in
considerable uncertainty in the marketplace. 179 This soul-searching
resulted in numerous proposals for revision of the practices followed in
sovereign debt restructuring, 180 including a major report from the
Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform, published by
the Brookings Institute,' 8 1 and staff reports emanating from within the
5 2
IMF.
Importantly, nearly all of these proposals focus on contractual
measures for repairing sovereign debt restructuring practices. The
IMF's return to the question of sovereign debt restructuring is not a
return to the notion that some sort of mandatory procedure should be
created to bind dissenters to the vote of a supermajority. Instead, after
surveying various IMF policies and practices in the area and applying

177. See JAVIER DiAZ-CASSOU ET AL., BANCO DE ESPARA,THE ROLE OF THE IMF IN
RECENT SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLICY OF LENDING
INTO ARREARS (2008).
178. See Aitor Erce, Sovereign Debt Restructuringsand the IMF: Implications for Future
Official Interventions (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Globalization and Monetary Policy
Institute, Working Paper No. 143, 2013), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/
documents/institute/wpapers/2013/0143.pdf.
179. See, e.g., id. at 2. As such, it was argued that "the international community could
Id. at 1.
benefit from granting the IMF a more standardized operations role ....
180. See, e.g., CHRISTOPH G. PAULUS, A DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM FOR
SOVEREIGNS: Do WE NEED A LEGAL PROCEDURE? (2014); Christoph G. Paulus, A Standing
Arbitral Tribunal as a Procedural Solution for Sovereign Debt Restructurings, in
SOVEREIGN DEBT AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: WILL THIS TIME BE DIFFERENT? 317, 319
(Carlos A. Primo Braga & Gallina A. Vincelette eds., 2011) (recommending the
establishment of an arbitral tribunal as the cure to problems endemic to restructuring, as
such a tribunal could provide a legal structure facilitating interaction between and
consensus among key stakeholders); Bergljot Barkbu et al., Financial Crises and the
Multilateral Response: What the Historical Record Shows, 88 J. INT'L ECON. 422 (2012)
(arguing that sovereign debt "contingent convertible" bonds should exist, containing
automatic provisions for restructuring whenever a country's debt-to-GDP ratio exceeded
some agreed-upon level); Mody, supra note 130, at 736-741 (also arguing in favor of
sovereign debt "contingent convertibles"); Lee C. Buchheit, Six Lessons from Prior Debt
1-2 (Sept. 14, 2011),
Restructurings, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON.,
http://iie.com/publications/papers/buchheit2011O913.pdf (describing various contractual
means for diluting creditors' rights when restructuring necessitated).
181. See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 13 at I, III (noting that the Committee "is a
non-partisan, independent group of experts, comprised of academics and former
government and central bank officials" and listing its "lead authors" as Lee C. Buchheit,
Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati, Ugo Panizza, Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Jeromin
Zettelmeyer and another twelve individuals as other committee members).
182. See 2013 Staff Report, supranote 20; 2014 Staff Report, supranote 21.
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this framework to the analysis of IMF-supported initiatives between
2005 and 2013,183 the 2013 staff report made few direct
recommendations other than the conclusion that "debt restructurings
have often been too little and too late" and have, thus, failed "to re18 4
establish debt sustainability and market access in a durable way."
However, this is not to say that the 2013 IMF staff report avoided
controversy altogether. After identifying various issues for possible
follow up, including consideration of various ways to incentivize "the
introduction of more robust aggregation clauses into international
sovereign bonds," such as through conditioning use of IMF's financing
"to the resolution of collective action problems," 18 5 paragraph thirty-two
of this report indicated that IMF staff was interested in "exploring
additional ways to limit the risk that Fund resources will simply be
18 6
used to bail out private creditors."'
Last year, the IMF's executive board considered the 2013 staff
report but made no final decision. 87 In the spring of 2014, IMF staff
published a second policy paper on sovereign debt restructuring. 88
Unlike its earlier report, the 2014 staff report put a "market-based"
proposal on the table. 8 9 Specifically, the report proposed that the
Fund's exceptional access policy should be revised to eliminate the 2010
systemic exemption and provide the IMF additional flexibility "in
circumstances where a member has lost market access and debt is

183. 2013 Staff Report, supra note 20, at 1-2.
184. Id. at 1, 7, 15.
185. Id. at 2.
186. Id. at 26, para. 32.
187. At their May 2013 meeting, the IMF Executive Board noted the preliminary staff
work and encouraged an additional "two-stage work program that would begin with issues
related to the timeliness and adequacy of debt restructurings and collective action
problems." IMF, IMF Executive Board Discusses Sovereign Debt Restructuring-Recent
Developments and Implications for the Fund's Legal and Policy Framework, Public
Information
Notice No.
13/61 (May 23, 2013), https://www.imf.org/external]
np/sec/pn12013/pn1361.htm. Without deciding the issue, a public information notice on the
Board's meeting indicated that 'Directors saw the benefits of focusing further work in this
area on options to strengthen the existing contractual framework," but also suggested
some division on whether contractual measures would be sufficient, especially given
"ongoing litigation against Argentina in U.S. courts." Id. Agreeing that this litigation
"could have implications for future sovereign debt restructurings," some Directors thought
"a statutory framework ... could be worth exploring" for resolution of holdout problems.
Id. 'Most [Directors] were also open to further examination of the merits and feasibility of
possible modalities for linking Fund support to the resolution of collective action
problems." Id.
188. See 2014 Staff Report, supra note 21.
189. Id. at 1.
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considered sustainable, but not with high probability."'9 0 In this event,
the IMF could approve access in excess of normal limits "on the basis of
a debt operation that involves an extension of maturities . . . ," but IMF
would not engage in any other modification of the terms of the sovereign
debt arrangement (that is, a modification of the timing of the debt that
was owed, but without a reduction of principal or interest).191 This
"reprofiling" would require creditor consent to the amended terms; while
the IMF would be involved in explaining its debt sustainability analysis,
it could not mandate creditors' agreement to the proposed extension of
the term of the debt-collective action problems associated with this
agreement would be resolved through enforcement of collective action
192
clauses in existing sovereign bonds.
When the IMF executive board members considered the report at
the June 2014 meeting, they "saw merit" in the proposal but again
looked for further consultation on the topic. 193 Reaction to the proposal
has been mixed.1 94 Perhaps importantly, the proposal attracted the

190. Id. As initially adopted in 2002, the exceptional access policy specified that the
Fund could prove large scale sovereign financing above normal access limits, but that this
funding would require restructuring of the sovereign's debt unless the Fund also
determined after "a rigorous and systematic analysis" that there was "a high probability
that the member's ... debt" was "sustainable in the medium term." Id. at 33. In reaction
to the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the exceptional access framework had been modified in
2010 to provide a systemic risk exemption for debt restructuring where "significant
uncertainties" prevent categorical assurances that there is a high probability that the debt
is sustainable. Id.
191. Id. at 1.
192. Id. at 2.
193. IMF, IMF Executive Board Discusses the Fund's Lending Framework and
14/294
(June
20,
2014),
Debt,
IMF
Press
Release
No.
Sovereign
http://www.imf.orglexternal/np/sec/pr/2014/pr14294.htm.
194. Compare Miranda Xafa, Commentary, The IMF's Lending Framework and
Sovereign Debt Restructuring 2 (July 2014), http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default
files/commentary_6.pdf (a senior fellow with the Centre for International Governance
Innovation noting that the "proposed framework is a clear improvement over the systemic
exemption"), and Bodo Ellmers, IMF Acknowledges Failure of Recent Debt Restructurings,
Proposes New Reforms, EURODAD (May 30, 2013), http://www.eurodad.org/Entries/view/
1545535/2013/05/30/IMF-acknowledges-failure-of-recent-debt-restucturings-proposes-newreforms (arguing that "the reforms proposed by IMF staff are certainly useful steps
towards overcoming some of the flaws we have seen in recent sovereign debt
restructurings" but that resolution of the issue may require UN involvement), with
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL CRISIS
PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION, VIEWS ON THE WAY FORWARD FOR STRENGTHENING THE
DEBT
RESTRUCTURING
3
(Jan.
2014),
FRAMEWORK
FOR
SOVEREIGN
http://www.iif.com/news/capital-markets-and-emerging-markets-policy/iif-special.
committee-financial-crisis-prevention (noting concerns "that adoption of the 'presumption'
of creditor involvement at the outset of new IMF programs would signal a new, more
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attention of the Russian diplomats involved in the G-20's meetings in
St. Petersburg. 195 Following meetings in Brisbane in 2014, the G-20
Leaders' Communiqu6 again reported approval of progress that had
196
been made on this issue.
Among recent proposals for reform of sovereign debt restructuring
practices, only the Brookings Report has advocated the need for a
197
It
statutory response to practices in sovereign debt adjustment.
proposes the creation of a Sovereign Debt Adjustment Facility (SDAF)
that looks to address IMF handling of sovereign debt with "a significant
risk of being unsustainable."19 8 While in principle the IMF should not be
lending in this instance at all, in practice political pressure to provide
assistance is nearly irresistible, contends the Report. To address this
practice, the Brookings Report proposes the creation of an SDAF that
would transparently address the problem of debt that may well be
unsustainable. This SDAF would differ significantly from the SDRM
proposed by the IMF in 2001 199-specifically, it would limit access to
SDAF funding based on a state's application, followed by a draft Debt
Sustainability Analysis that would form the basis for multilateral
negotiations; these negotiations would lead to restructuring of the
state's sovereign debt with the goal of support by "at least 75 percent of
the affected debt instruments."200 Rather than staying holdouts'

demanding and rigid policy rule" which would "undermine market confidence" and "raise
problems of moral hazard").
195. Although the issue of sovereign debt restructuring was not itself addressed by the
G-20 in St. Petersburg Leaders' Statement, the IMFs renewed interest in the topic was
commented on in a press conference held at the close of that meeting. See Press Release,
Outcomes of the G-20 Presidency, http://g20russia.comlen/presseng/item/891-outcomes-ofthe-russian-g20-presidency.html.
196. G-20, G-20 Leaders' Communiqug, Brisbane Summit, para. 12 (Nov. 15-16, 2014),
http://g20watch.edu.au/sites/default/files/pictures/brisbane-g20_leaders
summitscommunique.pdf (welcoming progress in strengthening "orderliness and
predictability of the sovereign debt restructuring process").
197. See generally BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 13. Indeed, this report looks to
minimize the difference between the sovereign debt adjustment facility that it
recommends and the "strong form" of CACs it proposes. Id. at v. "The main difference
between the two proposals is that the second would do more to correct biases that delay
necessary debt restructuring' in part because "the IMF-based proposal would have
immediate effects, while better collective action clauses would become effective only
gradually, as existing debt is replaced by newly issued debt." Id.
198. Id. at 32.
199. Id. at 34 (noting that "[u]nlike the SDRM, there would not [sic] be no automatic
stay of litigation; no tribunal to hear disputes between the debtor and its creditors; and no
mechanism for binding all creditors to the will of the supermajority" and that "the main
emphasis of the SDAF, unlike the SDRM, would be to establish a commitment device that
would preclude the Fund from financing countries with doubtful debt sustainability").
200. Id.
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litigation, the SDAF would "defang" these suits by immunizing the
assets and revenue streams of a debtor country against attachment-a
protection that appears to resemble exemption laws that identify an
individual borrower's assets that are free from the reaches of specified
collecting creditors. 201 But both the SDRM and SDAF suggest
mandatory relief beyond mere contractual resolution of sovereign debt
problems.
IV.

COMPARING SOVEREIGN AND CONSUMER BORROWERS

Sovereign debt has been viewed, conventionally, as a puzzle:
although lenders' remedies for enforcement of sovereign debt are
limited, sovereign borrowers have nonetheless historically borrowed,
and sovereign lenders lent, substantial amounts. 202 Addressing this
puzzle, modern economic literature has asked why sovereign debt got
paid at all and "concluded that borrowers repay because defaults are
economically costly for the debtor country."203 Based on this logic,
commentators argued that "attempts to reduce the costs of default could
also reduce welfare because they would make sovereign debt more
expensive and lower the maximum level of debt that a sovereign can
accumulate." On these grounds, commentators opposed proposals to
make sovereign debt restructuring easier. 20 4 Based on this logic, nothing
like Chapter 11 was needed to resolve sovereign debt problems.
But modern economic literature on sovereign debt has been chasing
the wrong metaphor. The puzzle of sovereign debt shifts when sovereign
borrowing is viewed through the lens of consumer (not corporate)
borrowing. This shift promises more than a new rhetoric. The sections
below outline some of the implications of this changed perspective.

A. Why Lenders Lend and Borrowers Do Not Always Default When
Assets Provide No Backstop
Consumer credit (especially the unsecured variant, such as that of a
credit card credit) differs from corporate lending. When the debtor is a
corporation or similar legal person, its creditors can force repayment
through a sale of the corporation's assets. But these powers are
"partitioned" in that they are limited to the assets of the corporation;
201. Id.
202. See id. at 5 (noting that sovereign remedies "are limited by the fact that most
sovereign assets are located within a sovereign's jurisdiction and cannot be seized, even
when creditors have won in court").
203. Id.
204. Id.
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the corporate form means that shareholders enjoy "entity protections" in
that a corporation's creditors cannot force a sale of the assets of the
corporation's owners or other entities.20 5 When viewed from the
perspective of creditors' remedies on default, all corporate lending,
whether secured or not, is a sort of "asset-based lending."
By contrast, consumer credit often is not extended based solely on a
borrower's assets. Although a consumer's lender could force a sale of the
borrower's assets in the event of a default, largely these household
goods hold little value and may be exempted at law from the reach of
creditors. Credit card issuers extend credit primarily based on a
206
borrower's income and her willingness and ability to repay.
Sovereign lenders make essentially the same calculus as consumer
lenders, although sovereign "income" comes from an entire economy of
workers and their tax commitments. Like consumer lenders, sovereign
lenders know that they are unlikely to be repaid out of the borrower's
assets. Sovereign lenders also know that repayment from sources other
than forced asset recoveries will be difficult. Although neither sovereign
nor consumer lenders can force repayment from their debtors' "income"
without restrictions of some sort, 20 7 both sorts of lenders extend credit
based on ex ante assessment of historical accounts of the debtor's
payment and default practices. Both sovereign and consumer borrowing
are, from this perspective, better viewed as "income-based lending."
Income-based lending generally is profitable because, by and large,
debtors repay their debts, if not on time then at least eventually.
Sophisticated mathematical models assist both sorts of lenders in
making ex ante assessments about borrowers' likelihood of repayment.
This modeling allows them to predict default rates, and thus also allows
them to set pricing at levels that ensure healthy profits. Securitization
of both household and sovereign debt allows for further sorting
according to taste for risk, with the most risk averse lenders buying
205. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the
Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (2006) (describing corporations as
providing asset partitioning and entity shielding functions).
206. Indeed, arguments favoring a means-tested Chapter 7 were based on assertions
that credit card lending had shifted from asset based to income based lending. See, e.g.,
Raymond T. Nimmer, Consumer Bankruptcy Abuse, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 96
(1987).
207. As a matter of public policy, countries may protect a portion of a debtor's wages
from execution. Certain assets may be protected from creditor collection, and assets that
aid the debtor's earning capacity are likely to be exempt from the reaches of creditors
precisely because policy interests in enforcing creditors' claims are not understood to
trump the debtor's ability to earn the wages needed for repayment. Moreover, certainly in
the United States, but also in other countries, a debtor can obtain a "discharge" from debt
that remains unpaid after some bankruptcy process has been concluded. For general
discussion of these issues of consumer collection law, see World Bank, supra note 148.
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related asset-backed securities with AAA ratings, and the most risk
preferring of these lenders buying "junk bond" rated securities that
promise far higher returns in exchange for heightened risks. And
supplementing these securities with credit default swaps or other
derivatives also shifts some of the heightened risks associated with this
debt.
B. Why RestructuringIs So Difficult
Comparing sovereign debt to consumer debt also clarifies the
difficulties of restructuring either sort of obligation. The securitization
of Brady bonds in the late 1980s meant that sovereign debt was
extended privately, not by a handful of globally powerful banks, but
instead by a large number of bondholders. 208 Policy makers feared that
sovereign debt restructuring would become even more difficult than it
had been in the past because reaching near unanimous agreement with
a large number of actors is far more difficult than reaching near
unanimous agreement with a small number of actors. But in the 1990s
and 2000s, and even more recently, collective action problems of this
sort did not plague most sovereign debt negotiations. 209 Recent litigation
between hedge fund holdouts and Argentina might be viewed as
confirmation that holdouts constitute the biggest impediment to
210
sovereign debt restructuring.
The biggest problem that both sovereign and consumer lenders face
in trying to restructure debts premised on their borrowers' ability to pay
is that restructuring-that is, a negotiated reduction in the effective
interest rate or outstanding principal amounts of these loans-is only
rational for "income-based" lenders when lenders are convinced that the
debtor cannot pay, not just unwilling to pay. And that takes a lot of
convincing, especially in the case of sovereign debt. Measurements of ex
ante ability to pay and ex post sustainability are fraught with difficulty
in both consumer and sovereign debt contexts.

208. See Adam Feibelman, American States and Sovereign Debt Restructuring,in WHEN
STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN
FISCAL CRISIS 146, 161 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. eds., 2012).
209. See, e.g., Das et al., supra note 175, at 43-45; Committeri & Spadafora, supra note
176, at 7-9.

210. See UN Agency Warns Argentina Debt Ruling Does not Comply with US Sovereign
Immunities Act, MERCOPRESS (June 26, 2014, 4:40 AM), http://en.mercopress.com/2014/06/
26/un.agency-warns-argentina-debt-ruling-does-not-comply-with-us-sovereign-immunitiesact.
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Moreover, these assessments become even more difficult as the term
over which these debts are repaid increases. 211 In theory (and absent a
discharge in bankruptcy), consumers can apply income to repayment of
their debts as long as they can work, and possibly longer if other sources
of income can be applied to debt repayment (or if debts are inherited by
other members of the debtor's family); in theory, sovereign debt is owed
"forever," unless lenders agree to forgive or restructure the outstanding
amount or it is repaid in full. 212 Given the potential for such long
horizons, even where lenders are convinced that the borrower's debt is
currently unsustainable, lenders may refuse to forgive the debt if they
think that the debtor's circumstances are subject to change.
Assessment of measurements of the sustainability of consumer debt
levels has been contentious. The 2005 amendments to U.S. consumer
bankruptcy law sought to limit access to Chapter 7 liquidation to those
individuals whose consumer debts were not repayable within a five-year
period. 213 These amendments took discretion away from bankruptcy
judges and substituted in its place a complex formula for assessing
consumer debtor's ability to repay outstanding indebtedness. 214 These
means-testing provisions were-and remain-hotly debated.
Debate on when consumer debt ought to be discharged is not unique
to the United States. Within Europe, there is little agreement as to
whether debt adjustment or some other sort of consumer bankruptcy
legislation generally should be adopted; although members of the
European Union otherwise have agreed to harmonize a wide range of
laws governing litigation procedure, as well as the substantive laws
governing commercial and financial transactions, consumers' access to
insolvency relief differs substantially in Europe.21 5 And outside
211. Even where the debt is structured to mature on a particular date, these terms are
flexible given options to roll over old debt into new debt with an extended due date.
212. See BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 13, at 15 (noting that "although sovereign debt
contracts are hard to enforce, they also last forever"); see also Stephen Castle, That Debt
from 1720? Britain's Payment Is Coming, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 27, 2014, http://nyti.ms/
1Bf3WOb (discussing recent news reports of Britain's repayment in full of bonds initially
issued in the eighteenth century).
213. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(V)(iii) (2014). See also Jean Braucher, Means
Testing Consumer Bankruptcy: The Problem of Means, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 407
(2002).
214. See Braucher, supra note 213, at 448.
215. This dissensus may change in the medium term as the European Commission has
signaled its interest in greater harmonization of insolvency laws involving individual
entrepreneurs. See, e.g., Commission Recommendation on a New Approach to Business
Failureand Insolvency, COM (2014) 1500 final (Dec. 3, 2014) (discussing a recent proposal
by the European Commission urging greater convergence in this area). Agreement on
European standards for the insolvency treatment of consumer debtors is not recommended
in this report, however.
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Europe-in Asia and Africa especially, but also generally-consumers

216
find little in the way of debt relief.

The fact that assessment of unsustainable sovereign debt is
complicated would come as no surprise to policy makers immersed in
assessing the sustainability of consumer debt levels. Much of the
problem with the IMF's extensive access policies, premised on a finding
that sovereign debt is sustainable with a high degree of probability, is
that its Debt Sustainability Analyses (DSAs) are based on a
combination of quantitative (economic) and qualitative (political)
factors. 217 The systemic exception to this policy that the IMF developed
when assessing the sustainability of Greek sovereign lending added fuel
218
to the fires that raged on this topic.
Recent proposals to reprofile sovereign debt in the gray area
between debt that is sustainable with a high degree of certainty and
debt that is more likely unsustainable removes the politically difficult
requirement that any new lending should be conditioned on
restructuring of existing debt, but it does not remove responsibility for
assessing the sustainability of this debt. 219 Indeed, the decision to
reprofile may depend more heavily on a sustainability analysis than did
earlier systemic assessments. Assessment of the process for developing
these DSAs is, thus, an important part of determining the workability of
this reform proposal.
The SDAF proposed by the Committee on International Economic
Policy and Reform looks to pave a way around "a 'gray area' in which
predefined criteria raise doubts about the lack of debt sustainability,"
but to which few want to commit. 220 The Committee has argued that the
primary benefit of its proposal is that an SDAF would limit the IMF's
flexibility in this gray zone. 22 1 Comparison of sovereign to consumer
financial distress suggests another benefit: the Facility would add
substantial transparency and stakeholder involvement to the process
through which DSAs are produced, as well as offer a forum for all
interested parties to buy into the assessment that a sovereign's debt is
sustainable, or is only sustainable if specified restructuring is pursued.
216. See, e.g., Soogeun Oh, Insolvency Law Reform of Korea: A Continuing Learning
Process 8-9 (Dec. 16-17, 2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/2490824.pdf.

217. See IMF, Staff Guidance Note for Public Debt Sustainability Analysis in MarketAccess Countries (May 9, 2013), http://www.imf.org/external]np/pp/eng/ 2013/050913.pdf;

IMF, Modernizing the Framework for Fiscal Policy and Public Debt Sustainability
Analysis (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/ 2011/08051 1.pdf.
218. See IMF, supra note 138.
219. See 2014 Staff Report, supranote 21, at 1.
220. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 13, at 33.
221. Id.
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Thus, given lenders' limited incentives to restructure "incomebased" loans, it seems miraculous that any sort of debt reduction occurs
on a voluntary basis, especially when the debtor owes numerous
creditors who must all be convinced of the wisdom of debt adjustment.
C. Why Borrowers Borrow Too Much, Why Lenders Are Fine With That,
and the Implications of Both for RestructuringPolicies
But there is even greater reason for concern about the ex post
incentives associated with "income-based" lending, because comparison
of consumer to sovereign debt also explains pathologies in ex ante
incentives in this context. Consumer borrowers may overborrow because
they do not act like the rational decision makers that economic models
would posit: behavioral decision research suggests that individuals
make errors in comparing short- and long-term costs and that framing
of the costs can distort consumers' perceptions; it also suggests that
consumers can be overoptimistic about their prospects for income
growth and whether shocks to their earnings capacity will disrupt
222
income.
Like consumer borrowers, sovereign borrowers face incentives to
overborrow, although for different reasons. Sovereign debtors'
pathologies arise more from agency problems than from cognitive
limitations. A sovereign's self-interested politicians have every incentive
to borrow to provide short-term benefits in the next election, but this
223
borrowing imposes costs further down the road for their successors.
Compounding incentives to overborrow, consumer lenders and sovereign
lenders also face market incentives to overlend. As with overborrowing,
the causes for overlending differ depending on the nature of the lenders'
borrower. The result is the same in both cases, however: too much debt.
Some consumer lenders structure their businesses on the backs of
debtors in default. More than simply collecting the additional fees and
higher interest in a default context, payday lenders, for example, lend
on a very short-term basis, although a majority of their borrowers

222. For greater detail on pathologies in consumers' cognitive decision making, see
OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT:

LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN

CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of
Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073 (2009); Oren Bar-Gill &
Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008); Oren Bar-Gill,
Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 33 (2006); and Susan BlockLieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the RationalBorrower: Rationality, Behavioralism,
and the Misguided 'Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481 (2006).
223. See BROOKINGS REPORT, supranote 13, at 8 (arguing that "policymakers often have
incentives to borrow more than what is socially optimal").
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extend this loan for additional periods. 224 Payday lending may exceed
welfare-optimizing levels and yet remain profitable for payday
lenders. 225 Moreover, payday lenders are not the only consumer lenders
suspected of lending in excess of socially optimal levels. The foreclosure
crisis in the United States has been attributed, in large part, to the
securitization of high-risk subprime residential mortgages loans. The
tranching of pools of subprime mortgages and issuance of Residential
Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) to the capital markets allowed the
risk averse to purchase market-grade RMBS, which they demanded at
unprecedented levels. Many argue that high demand for RMBS created
226
excessive supplies of subprime mortgages.
Sovereign lenders' incentives to overlend are distinct from consumer
lenders' incentives to overlend. Sovereign lenders' overlending may well
be, at least in part, attributable to the moral hazard created by the
expectation of official sector bailouts. Bailouts from international
lenders of last resort create incentives for sovereign creditors to "behave
recklessly and lend without adequate regard to risk because official
bailout packages may allow for repayments that are 'too high' with
respect to the social optimum." 227 The cost of rescue loans are
externalized, not by "global taxpayers but by local taxpayers who end up
'228
repaying, even when it would have been better to restructure.
Overlending to sovereigns might also occur because of the absence of
seniority rules associated with sovereign debt repayment. Some argue
that new loans provided to countries whose debt burdens are already
224. See, e.g., Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the
Payday Lending Market, 126 Q. J. ECON. 517, 523 (2011).
225. See, e.g., LESLIE PARRISH & URIAH KING, PHANTOM DEMAND: SHORT-TERM DUE
DATE GENERATES NEED FOR REPEAT PAYDAY LOANS, ACCOUNTING FOR 76% OF TOTAL
VOLUME 19 (2009). But see DONALD P. MORGAN, DEFINING AND DETECTING PREDATORY

LENDING 22-23 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. Staff Report No. 273, 2007) (concluding that
payday lending may not be "predatory" where borrowers are not more likely to miss
payday loan payments than other loan payments, but that it may be more expensive than
similar forms of credit depending on market concentration and competition).
226. See, e.g., KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. McCoY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS:
RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 71 (2011).
227. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 13, at 8. See also BARRY EICHENGREEN ET AL.,
PUBLIC DEBTS: NUTS, BOLTS AND WORRIES (Geneva Rep. on the World Econ. 13th ed.

2011) (discussing the long-term perspective on debt sustainability and arguing that fiscal
stabilization is easier the faster the economy is growing).
228. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 13, at 8-9 (noting also that while this lender
"moral hazard can be mitigated by designing official rescue packages that 'bail-in' private
creditors" these sorts of bail-ins only get negotiated ex post and so "may not be optimal. .
."). See also Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, InternationalBailouts, Moral Hazard
and Conditionality, 16 ECON. POLY 407-32 (2001) (arguing that availability and size of
official crisis lending for international bailouts need to be conditional on government
policies before the crisis).

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 22:2

high can "dilute" the claims of existing creditors, and that this debt
dilution can lead to overborrowing and overlending because the
marginal interest rates on which the new loan is extended do not reflect
the increase in risk that these new loans present more generally to the
debtor. 229 Econometric analysis provides further support for the claim
230
that this dilution affects sovereign debt default risks.
Others argue that herding behaviors may explain sovereign lenders'
willingness to "take on too much risk during periods of global
optimism" 231-a phenomenon with econometric support. 232 Herding
behaviors may also cause lenders to liquidate good loans when others in
the market are also selling, 23 3 and economic research similarly
demonstrates that sovereign debt markets may suddenly freeze in the
face of a global shock, based on a presumption that the loans are not
sustainable.234
Finally, these incentives can accumulate. When consumers' ex ante
tendencies to overborrow and lenders' ex ante incentives to overlend are
combined with inherent difficulties in assessing the sustainability of
229. See Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign
Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime, 115 J. POL. ECON. 901, 920 (2007). See also
EDUARDO BORENSZTEIN ET AL., SOVEREIGN DEBT STRUCTURE FOR CRISIS PREVENTION,
IMF Occasional Paper WP/237 (2004) (discussing the costs and benefits of different
sovereign debt structures for crisis prevention). See generally, BROOKINGS REPORT, supra
note 13, at 9 (discussing this scholarship).
230. See generally Juan Carlos Hatchondo, Leonardo Martinez & Csar Sosa Padilla,
Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk, (IMF, Working Paper WP/11/70, 2011),
(proposing a
available at https://www.imf.orglexternal/pubslft/wp/2011/wpll7O.pdf
modification to a baseline sovereign default framework which allows for consideration of
the level and volatility of the interest rate spread paid by sovereigns through
quantification of the importance of debt dilution).
231. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 13, at 9.
232. Id. See also Ugo Panizza, Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The
Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 651-98 (2009)
(examining recent literature on sovereign debt and relating it to the evolution of the legal
principles underlying the sovereign debt market); Salvatore Dell'Erba, Ricardo Hausmann
& Ugo Panizza, Debt Levels, Debt Composition, and Sovereign Spreads in Emerging and
Advanced Economies (Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper No. 263,
2013) (studying the interaction between debt composition and debt levels in advanced and
emerging market countries); COMM. ON INT'L ECON. POL'Y & REFORM, BANKS AND CROSSBORDER CAPITAL FLOWS: POLICY CHALLENGES AND REGULATORY RESPONSES (2012)
(proposing a framework for cross-border banking flows and for improved coordination of
debt regulation).
233. See generally Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, Beauty Contests
and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 719-52 (2006) (discussing
general herding behaviors).
234. See generally GUILLERMO A. CALVO, EMERGING CAPITAL MARKETS IN TURMOIL: BAD
LUCK OR BAD POLICY? (2005) (examining issues of market fluctuations from the
perspective of emerging market economies themselves).
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these debts ex post and in restructuring these obligations in times of
financial crisis ex post, the situation can turn toxic.
Both the Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform
and the IMF detail extensive support for the claim that sovereign debt
restructuring occurs too late to make a difference. 235 Undoubtedly, the
causes of this delay are partly political. Some commentators argue that
delays in restructurings occur as a result of agency costs inherent in
democratic political structures. 236 Self-interested politicians have every
incentive to delay debt renegotiations, which are painful and costly for
their constituents. Short-term political horizons create incentives for
these politicians to borrow their way out of financial difficulties,
knowing that the full costs of these loans are unlikely to be felt until
after they have left office.
An IMF 2013 staff report supports this argument with numerous
anecdotes of countries' decisions to restructure coming only after market
access is lost and well after IMF staff information of unsustainable debt
levels. 237 The Committee on International Economic Policy and Reform
succinctly details the consequences of this delay as follows:
Delayed defaults can lead to the destruction of value
because a prolonged predefault crisis may reduce a
country's capacity and willingness to pay. Its capacity to
pay is reduced because procrastination prolongs the
climate of uncertainty, high interest rates and
restrictive fiscal policies that are ineffective in avoiding
default but amplify output contractions. Delayed
defaults reduce its willingness to pay because electors
that have suffered long periods of economic austerity are

235. See 2013 Staff Report, supra note 20; BROOKINGS REPORT, supranote 13, at 10-12.
See also Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign Default, 56 IMF
STAFF PAPERS 683-741 (2009) (evaluating reputational costs, international trade
exclusion costs, costs to the domestic economy through the financial system, and political
costs, in order to contrast the costs of a sovereign default with the political consequences
of a debt crisis); Eduardo Levy Yeyati and Ugo Panizza, The Elusive Costs of Sovereign
Defaults, 94 J. DEV. ECON. 95-105 (2011) (using quarterly data to determine that default
episodes mark the start of economic recovery, and that the negative effects of a default are
likely to be driven by the anticipation of default, regardless of whether the entity actually
defaults or not).
236. See generally Viral V. Acharya & Raghuram G. Rajan, Sovereign Debt, Government
Myopia, and the Financial Sector, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 1526-60 (2013) (analyzing the
factors that determine the sustainability of sovereign debt). See also BROOKINGS REPORT,
supranote 13, at 10.
237. See 2013 Staff Report, supra note 20. See also BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 13,
at 11.
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less likely to
238
restructuring.

support

a

creditor-friendly

debt

Adding to this, the IMF and others find that sovereign debt
restructurings often seek "too little" in the way of debt reduction, which
has meant that sovereign borrowers frequently face continued financial
difficulty after a restructuring. 239 Powell and others argue that this
situation creates the possibility of "two, equally bad, equilibria." 240
These problems may also be exacerbated by "overoptimistic debt
sustainability assessments, with relatively small face-value haircuts
that did not restore debt sustainability, required prolonged official
241
support and led to additional restructurings."
D. Lessons Learned in the Consumer Context
Comparing sovereign to consumer borrowers does not provide ready
solutions to the sovereign debt crises that continue to plague world
markets. That is not surprising, for several reasons. First, as noted
above, consumer debt adjustment is redistributive. Whereas corporate
reorganization can be claimed to present a "win-win" solution for
creditors because a corporate debtor's going concern values are
preserved and shared with stakeholders with no claim beyond their
borrower's liquidation values, the same sort of argument is
unconvincing in a consumer context. It is harder to argue that creditors
"do better" in a restructuring than they otherwise would have. The case
for discharging unsustainable consumer debt is built more broadly on
social welfare grounds than in terms of the benefits of consumer debt
adjustment to lenders.
Second, unlike with corporate insolvency law, there are no
international standards regarding the desirability or contents of
consumer bankruptcy laws (or related laws to address consumer overindebtedness). 242 Global consensus on the need for restructuring and
reduction of consumer debt levels has, thus far, eluded the international
community, but support for developing international standards in the

238. BROOKINGS REPORT, supranote 13, at 10.
239. See 2013 Staff Report, supra note 20. See also BROOKINGs REPORT, supra note 13,
at 11.
240. BROOKINGs REPORT, supra note 13, at 11. See also Andrew Powell, Bipolar Debt
Restructuring:Lessons from LAC, VOX LACEA (Feb. 24, 2011) (arguing that modern debt
restructuring schemes are ineffective), http://vox.lacea.org/?q=debt-lessons-LAC.
241. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 13, at 12 (discussing 2013 Staff Report, supra note

20).
242. See Liu & Rosenberg, supra note 149, at 12.
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consumer context is building. The World Bank report on the insolvency
treatment of natural persons is one such indication. 243 Work within the
European Commission presents another. 244 Experience under a broad
range of national efforts to adopt or reform domestic consumer
bankruptcy laws might also inform those interested in sovereign debt
restructuring practices.
How has the problem of overindebted consumers been addressed
globally, how successful have these efforts been, and what are the
implications from the consumer context for that involving sovereign
borrowers? A quick outline of important areas of overlap would include
the following:
1. Unfettered Dischargeof Debt
Between 1898 and 2005, the United States allowed individual
debtors (including consumers debtors) unfettered access to liquidation
in bankruptcy, placing few obstacles in front of the bankruptcy
discharge available in these Chapter 7 liquidation cases. 245 With 2005
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, the United States began to
condition the bankruptcy discharge on requiring individual debtors to
demonstrate their "need" for such relief by satisfying a complex "means
test."246 While neither courts nor creditors are permitted to force an
individual into a Chapter 13 debt repayment plan under U.S. law, as a
practical effect, these 2005 amendments work to condition discharge on

243. See generally World Bank, supranote 148 (providing a report on the characteristics
of the insolvency regime of natural persons and issues that need to be addressed by
policymakers in different communities).
244. See generally Iain Ramsay, Two Cheers for Europe: Austerity, Mortgage
Foreclosures and Personal Insolvency Policy in the EU, in CONSUMER DEBT AND SOCIAL
EXCLUSION (Irina Domurath & Hans-W. Micklitz eds., forthcoming July 2015) (discussing
the effects of the modern financial and economic crisis by analyzing the social goal of
inclusion and the effect of social exclusion through overindebtedness since 2008 in
Europe).
245. But see 11 U.S.C. §§ 523, 727 (2012) (setting out debts excepted from discharge for
policy reasons, and circumstances that preclude debtors from obtaining any discharge out
of the liquidation case).
246. Because the "means test" is mostly triggered under 11 U.S.C. § 707 for individuals
earning more than the median income for the state in which they reside, and because most
individual debtors earn less than the median income in their state, this "means testing"
did not preclude a quick bankruptcy discharge in Chapter 7 for most individual debtors.
Nonetheless, "means testing" has significantly affected consumer bankruptcy practices in
the United States since it was adopted in 2005. See generally Braucher, supra note 213
(discussing the implications of this 2005 amendment to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
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repayment of debt over a three- to five-year-long period. 247 Thus, the
comparison of sovereign to consumer indebtedness may support
instincts not to forgive sovereign debt too readily. Conditional discharge
is the norm in the consumer setting, 248 and conversations about
sovereign debt forgiveness should address this norm.
2. ConditionalDischargeof Debt
The World Bank Report on the Insolvency Treatment of Natural
Persons notes an emerging global consensus that an individual's access
to a discharge from over-indebtedness should be conditioned on courtsupervised repayment of such debts over some period. 249 Under U.S.
Chapter 13 debt repayment plans, repayment obligations often stretch
over a five-year period. 250 In Germany, this period may take up to six
years. 251 Other countries impose shorter probationary periods; for
example, in England and Wales, a discharge generally is available after
one year of repayment experience. 252 Although international standards
do not exist regarding the length of these payment periods, 253 together
these domestic debt adjustment laws suggest a solution to the
difficulties of assessing what debts are "sustainably" imposed on an
individual debtor: once an eligible debtor seeks protection from its
creditors, domestic legislation presumes that repayment in excess of the
statutory period is not sustainable, without requiring individuated

247. Creditors cannot push a debtor into a Chapter 13 case involuntarily. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 303(a) (permitting involuntary cases "only under Chapter 7 or 11 of this title"). The
voluntariness of Chapter 13 is partly based on policy concerns that obligations to repay
creditors are unworkable and partly on a fear that such a mandate would contravene
constitutional proscriptions on peonage. See also Karen Gross, The Debtor As Modern Day
Peon: A Problem of Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165 (1990)
(discussing relationships between debtors and creditors and the bankruptcy implications
of these relationships).
248. See World Bank, supra note 148, at 115; Liu & Rosenberg, supra note 149
(comparing consumer insolvency laws and noting their systemic importance).
249. See World Bank, supra note 148, at 115.
250. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (2012).

251. See, e.g., Michael Knobloch, Unemployment and Over-Indebtedness in Germany, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY 215 (Wolfram Backert et al., eds.,

2013) (in context of examining the causal relationship between unemployment and overindebtedness in Germany and analyzing the programs that seek to minimize that
relationship, noting details of German consumer debt adjustment laws).
252. See, e.g., LAIN RAMSAY, CONSUMER LAW AND POLIcY: TEXT AND MATERIALS ON
REGULATING CONSUMER MARKETS, at 493-95 (3rd ed. 2012).
253. See Liu & Rosenberg, supra note 149.
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assessments of the sustainability of plan payments. 254 Where discharge
is conditioned on something other than completion of some probationary
payment period, it is often conditioned on demonstration of the debtor's
abject poverty. Here, sovereign debt practices could learn from
consumer debt repayment practices that conditional discharge
motivates a borrower's repayment of sustainable debt obligations over
the statutorily set period. Sovereign debt forgiveness might be held in
abeyance-like a carrot before the donkey-pending payment over some
lengthy period (presumably much longer than the emerging
international norm of three to five years for individual debtors).
3. Exempt Property
Whether or not a country provides individuals with the possibility
for a discharge from unsustainable debt through bankruptcy processes,
it might also protect overindebted debtors from the prospect that debt
collection efforts will render them destitute by identifying certain
property as "exempt"-that is, as free from the reaches of creditors.
Based on these exemption laws, individual borrowers, although in
default and the subject of collection action, can continue to work and
protect at least some of their least valuable possessions. Sovereign
borrowers might similarly ring fence certain types of assets as "exempt"
and outside the reach of any sovereign lender.
4. Responsible Lending Regulation
Perhaps the most extreme difference between sovereign debt and
consumer debt is the complete absence of regulation of lending practices
in the sovereign debt context. Although international organizations
have begun to question whether sovereign debt problems should be
255
viewed as lending problems, not just problems of collection,
international organizations and international financial institutions
generally have ignored the benefits of a shift from ex post to ex ante
examination of sovereign debt problems.
By contrast, consumer lending is heavily regulated throughout the
globe. Increasingly, nations look carefully and require their consumer
lenders to look carefully at whether consumer borrowers have an
"ability to repay" their debts. This scrutiny is required to take place ex
254. Some countries permit discharge without the need for lengthy debt repayment
experience if the court or a supermajority of creditors determines that current debt levels
are unsustainable.
255. This absence exists despite some efforts by the UN's Conference on Trade and
Development to adopt "principles" on the topic. See UNCTAD PRINCIPLES, supra note 29.
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ante, well before the loan is entered into default. This building national
consensus has prompted a shift in international focus on the issue.
Recently, the G-20 has looked to more fully implement an international
agreement on the "key objectives" of consumer financial protection
regulation, including recommendation that lenders' assess their
256
consumer borrowers' ability to repay such loans.
Generally, a requirement to assess a consumer borrower's "ability to
repay" is construed to impose obligations of review and due diligence on
lenders. In some instances, failure to fulfill this obligation of responsible
lending may excuse a borrower's subsequent default. Sovereign lenders
might similarly be required to engage in a diligent ex ante assessment
of a sovereign borrower's "ability to repay."
To some extent, the IMF "exceptional access" limits work in this
257
way, but private sovereign lenders face no similar prescription.
UNCTAD's Principles on Responsible Sovereign Lending recommend ex
ante examination of sovereign loans, but nowhere compare sovereign
borrowing to consumer borrowing and propose only limited due
diligence in this context. 258 The Principles are a start, however.
Moreover, regulation of sovereign debt lending practices would
constitute regulation of sovereign lenders, but not state actors. As a
result, responsible sovereign lending regulation should raise fewer
concerns regarding intrusions on sovereignty since, after all, it is the
borrowers and not the lenders who are sovereign in the sovereign debt
context.
CONCLUSION
Although there are important distinctions between extensions of
consumer credit and sovereign lending, the metaphor to consumer
256. OECD, G-20 High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection 7 (Oct. 14,
2011) ("Depending on the nature of the transaction and based on information primarily
provided by customers financial services providers should assess the related financial
capabilities, situation and needs of their customers before agreeing to provide them with a
product, advice or service."), http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-markets/48892010.pdf.
See also G20/OECD Taskforce on Consumer Finance Protection, Update Report on the
Work to Support the Implementation of the G-20 High-Level Principles on Financial
Consumer Protection, 14 (Sept. 2013) ("For financial products in general a consumer's
ability to meet relevant payment obligations is assessed and verified before a transaction
is
concluded."),
http://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/financial-sector-reformlG2OEffective
ApproachesFCP.pdf.
257. Existing voluntary standards on sovereign debt restructuring do not broach this
topic. See INST. OF INT'L FINANCE, PRINCIPLES FOR STABLE CAPITAL FLOWS AND FAIR DEBT
(2004), https://www.iif.comlsystem/files/
MARKETS
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principles-final_- 0305.pdf.
258. UNCTAD PRINCIPLES, supra note 29.
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lending nonetheless produces useful insights to sovereign debt markets.
One important payoff from this shift in metaphor is to justify ex ante
focus on sovereign lending practices. In assessing sovereign lending
practices, the shift in metaphor directs us to examine consumer lenders'
practices in extending credit on the basis of a borrower's income stream
and not on the basis of the borrower's assets, as well as examine the
profitability of this sort of "income-based" lending. 259 Further, in
analyzing ex post incentives to restructure sovereign debt and the
implications of shifts in restructuring practices on ex ante borrowing,
reference to the burgeoning scholarship on household debtors'
overindebtedness and the reluctance to restructure would lend support
to the notion that sovereign borrowers also overborrow, sovereign
lenders overlend, and both wait too long to seek a remedy for excessive
260
debts that sovereigns struggle to pay.
Whether the comparison of consumer to sovereign debt is more apt
than a comparison of corporate to sovereign debt is less important than
whether either perspective suggests reform proposals that might garner
interest in the international community. Thinking outside existing
paradigms might be just what sovereign debt markets need.

259. See, e.g., Liran Einav, Mark Jenkins & Jonathan Levin, The Impact of Credit
Scoring on Consumer Lending, 44 RAND J. ECON. 249-74 (2013) (stating that the
adoption of automated credit scoring at a large auto finance company showed that credit
scoring resulted in better risk classification and more profitable lending practices).
260. See, e.g., UDO REIFNER ET AL., OVERINDEBTEDNESS IN EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW:
PRINCIPLES FROM 15 EUROPEAN STATES (2012) (discussing debt structures in European
consumer finance markets and comparing various laws for addressing overindebtedness).

